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Abstract 
 
Research indicates that the number of individuals diagnosed with neurological, learning 
and psychiatric disorders has shown a sharp increase in recent years. An increasing 
acknowledgement of the importance of narratives and discourses in constructing social 
reality has stimulated much debate on the consequences of diagnosing individuals with 
such diagnostic labels. The aim of this study was to explore the ways in which such 
individuals construct meaning from their experiences of adapting to their diagnostic 
labels by reframing them as interpersonal metaphors. In service of this aim, a social 
constructionist epistemology was adopted and discourse analysis was used to analyse the 
results from three participants’ interview data. The results indicate that participants 
managed to construct meaning from their experiences with their diagnostic labels through 
a reframing process that serve to promote positive perceptions of self in relation to others. 
Furthermore, this meaning-construction process appears to be a reflective and 
interactional one, in that it relies on a negotiation of meanings between people in a 
retrospective fashion. 
 
Keywords: diagnostic labels; meanings; meaning-construction; reframing; interpersonal 
metaphors; ecosystemic epistemology; social constructionism; language; discourse 
analysis; qualitative research 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
Mr. Reilly tried so hard to achieve a trance that he got in his own way and it was 
not until the third session that we found a useful approach. He was a member of a 
softball team that took play seriously. Their leading hitter in previous seasons, he 
had been dropped from third to eighth in the batting order because of his season-
long slump. They had even taken videotapes of his struggles, which he was 
watching in order to figure out what he was doing wrong. I told him that it 
seemed to me that they were going about it in the wrong way:  What he needed to 
do was watch himself getting hits. But they had no tapes of success (De Shazer, 
1985, p. 86). 
 
With advancements in the behavioural sciences such as psychology and psychiatry, there 
seems to be an increased tendency to apply diagnostic labels to various types of 
behavioural problems. Considering that these labels are problem-orientated and therefore 
highlight behavioural deficits of the individual, an interesting question is raised with 
regard to what the consequences of this act of labelling might be for the individual’s 
perceptions of self in relation to others.  
 
The assumption that guides this thesis is that the achievement of adaptive outcomes are 
not so much influenced by the diagnostic label or the stigmatising discourses operating 
around the label, but rather by the way these discourses are framed by the individual. 
Therefore, unlike Mr Reilly above, the focus of this study is on the hits of ‘disordered’ 
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individuals – I wanted to know what they are doing right and how are they framing right 
to turn their diagnostic labels into stories of success rather than debilitating struggles.  
 
Aim and rationale 
 
Research has shown that the number of children and adults diagnosed with neurological, 
learning and psychiatric disorders has shown a sharp increase over the past few decades 
(Wiener, 2007). An increasing acknowledgement of the importance of narratives and 
discourses in constructing social reality, has, however, stimulated much debate on the 
consequences of diagnosing individuals with diagnostic labels.  
 
The biggest objections come from sociologists that ascribe to labelling theory and 
symbolic interactionism (Becker, 2008; Gove, 1980; Lofland, 1969; Rubington & 
Weinberg, 2008; Schur, 1971; Schur, 1983; Wright, 1984) as well as theorists that ascribe 
to systems theory (Anderson, Goolishian & Winderman, 1986; Efran, Lukens & Lukens, 
1990; Keeney, 1979; Tomm & Sanders, 1983). The main argument against the use of 
diagnostic labels such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is that they tend 
to oversimplify and wrongfully attribute the causes of the behaviour they describe.  
 
In accordance with the latter statement, Levine (1997) suggests that the interaction 
between the environment and the individual is crucial in the manifestation of problem 
behaviour and suggests that “the socially-constructed act of diagnosis … reduces these 
complex transactional processes to problems that are perceived in terms of individual 
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dysfunction” (p. 201). Therefore, it seems that there is concern that the labelling of 
problematic behaviour ignores the complex and intricate relationship between the 
diagnosed individual, his or her family and the wider social environment. 
 
Another concern is for the effects of attaching a diagnostic label to individuals who 
exhibit problem behaviour. It seems that this concern has a double edge, in that some 
authors (e.g. Levine, 1997; Nylund, 2000) contend that diagnostic labels often result in 
individuals wrought with shame, resentment and low self-esteem, perceiving themselves 
as incompetent and thinking that there is something wrong with them.  
 
On the other hand, authors are concerned that the appropriation of a diagnostic label takes 
responsibility for behaviour away from the individual, resulting in a transformation of the 
individual from ‘transgressor’ to ‘victim’ (Du Plessis & Strydom, 1999; Rafalovich, 
2005; Reid, 1996; Wiener, 2007). In fact, Reid (1996) describes the functioning of labels 
as follows:  
 
Labels provide a context within which the actions of individuals are 
interpreted by society. In a very real sense labels allow us to ascribe 
meaning to behavior and the social message of a label may lead us to 
ascribe different meanings to the same behavior if individuals are labeled 
differently (p. 251). 
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In conducting a literature survey it became clear that most research on diagnostic 
labelling focuses on either one of three broad areas: 1) the process of labelling someone 
as deviant or disordered (i.e. the how of the labelling process); 2) the reasons for or 
causes behind the labelling of deviant or disordered behaviour (i.e. the why of the 
labelling process); and 3) the negative outcomes of diagnostic labels for those individuals 
who are labelled and for society.  
 
Inspired by the case illustration of Mr Reilly above (De Shazer, 1985) and the idea that 
language frames the way we perceive reality, the aim of this study was not to debate the 
existence or causes of neurological, learning or psychiatric disorders. Rather, in accepting 
that a ‘disorder’ becomes a reality for those diagnosed with it, the aim was to explore the 
ways in which such individuals construct meaning from their experiences of adapting to 
their diagnostic labels by reframing these labels as interpersonal metaphors.  
 
My assumption is that by reframing diagnostic labels as interpersonal metaphors, 
individuals’ frameworks for perceiving their ‘symptomatic behaviour’ enlarge and the 
diagnostic label itself becomes a signal for finding new patterns of relating to others; 
these new patterns of relating then also hold implications for the labelled individuals’ 
identity constructions (or perceptions of self in relation to others).  
 
I believe this endeavour will not only broaden our understanding of the utility of 
diagnostic labels, but that it will also offer some insight into the ways ‘disordered’ 
individuals construct the meanings of their diagnostic labels; meanings that are relevant 
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to their perceptions of self in relation to others, as well as to their future expectations. To 
state it more plainly: This exploration might offer other therapists and clients with some 
‘tapes of success’. 
 
Definitions of key concepts 
 
With the view of commencing with this complex, often ambiguous and mostly abstract 
narrative exploration of meaning-construction, some of the concepts central to this study 
will now be explicitly defined in order to clarify their meanings as intended in the context 
of this study.  
 
 Diagnostic labels and events 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter and as is explained in more detail in 
Chapter 2, the concept diagnostic label is often taken to signal, with high specificity, the 
causes and potential outcomes (prognosis) of a specific physical, neurological, learning 
or psychiatric disorder (Barlow & Durand, 2005). To avoid the pitfalls of objectifying 
this concept with absolute properties concerning cause and effect, a more fluid definition 
of diagnostic labels is adopted in this study. When reference is made to diagnostic labels, 
it is intended to refer to organising frameworks that can carry a multitude of meanings (in 
terms of, but not limited to cause and effect) as negotiated by the interactive exchange 
and coupling of meanings between an individual and his or her broader systems of living. 
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Closely tied to the concept of diagnostic label, the concept diagnostic event simply refers 
to a punctuated moment in time when an agreement was reached between the diagnosed 
individual and one or more other individuals (including a diagnostician) that a diagnostic 
label applies to the former as an organising framework for explaining a specific 
behavioural constellation. 
 
Reframing 
 
Moving from the idea that frameworks for perceiving and explaining reality are 
negotiated between individuals through a process of exchanging meanings, the 
implication emerges that reality is not absolute, but flexible and subject to change as a 
function of the negotiation of meanings (Andersen, 1992; Hoffman, 1992). Therefore, the 
act of reframing in this study refers to a renegotiation of the meanings of reality 
(specifically the meanings of diagnostic labels) and is by this definition an interactive 
process involving at least two individuals (the diagnosed individual and usually a friend, 
family member or therapist - in this case me).  
 
Social discourse 
 
Through the interactive process of negotiating and constructing the nature of reality, 
various meanings have come to be accepted as general truths as a result of their 
usefulness in illustrating and projecting cultural values. The concept social discourses 
here refers to those local, cultural truisms that are accepted as fundamental to the nature 
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and meaning of reality and have become implicit in the belief systems of the members of 
various societies and hence serve to construct the social realities prevalent in these 
societies (Terre Blanche, Durrheim & Kelly, 2006). An example of a social discourse is 
the saying: “Good fences make for good neighbours”, which illustrates the Western value 
of individuality. 
 
Interpersonal metaphors 
 
The value of metaphors is described by Andolfi (1989) as being ambiguous 
representations of reality in that they represent aspects of reality without resorting to 
absolute truths. Metaphors are therefore useful devices to mobilise the fluidity of 
meaning as they allow individuals to construct alternative meanings by capturing and 
making intelligible those aspects of reality that are relevant to their experiences, and 
organising them into meaningful frameworks for perceiving reality. Diagnostic labels as 
interpersonal metaphors are hence defined as devices to represent the interpersonal 
meanings that individuals construct as they pertain to their diagnostic labels and the 
behaviour these represent. 
 
Identity/perception of self 
 
Departing from the intrapsychic conceptualisation of identity as a stable entity that 
characterises individuals’ images of themselves (Meyer, Moore & Viljoen, 2003), 
identity in the context of this study takes on a more dynamic meaning. It is defined here 
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as an individual’s perception of self as a function of the patterns of relating and the role 
definitions he or she adopts in relation to significant others within a specific context of 
interaction. Therefore, identity is not deemed to be a stable entity to be discovered, but 
rather the product of interactional processes situated within interactional contexts. It then 
emerges that identity is taken to be a matter of defining oneself in relation to others and 
the context and can change as a function of the latter. Given this definition of identity, the 
concept is used interchangeably with the concepts perception of self and definition of self 
in relation to others. 
 
Status quo 
 
In systemic discourse, the concept status quo refers to a system’s tendency to maintain 
relatively stable patterns of organisation (Becvar & Becvar, 2000). In accordance with 
this definition, the concept of status quo as used in this study refers to an individual’s (i.e 
an individual as system’s) preferred patterns of relating to and defining himself or herself 
in relation to others as well as his or her future expectations.  
 
Systemic crises 
 
A systemic crisis ensues when the status quo or homeostasis of a system is disrupted by 
input that blocks the usual patterns of systemic organisation (Becvar & Becvar, 2000). 
Similarly, systemic crisis in the context of this study refers to the blocking of preferred or 
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usual patterns of relating as evident in the definition of the individual’s self as a system. 
The systemic crisis therefore requires that new patterns of organisation be established. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In lieu of the aims of this study as outlined above, the chapters that follow each presents 
various aspects of my attempt to address the research problem. In Chapter 2, relevant 
literature on labelling theory as well as the effects of labelling, with specific focus on 
diagnostic labelling, is discussed. This chapter will also presents a discussion of the 
ontological and epistemological basis of this study by giving attention to the postmodern 
ontology as well as the ecosystemic and social constructionist conceptualisations 
regarding the nature of reality, with special reference to its implications for diagnostic 
labelling.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on describing the qualitative research design as applied in this study. 
The specific strategies applied in selecting and interviewing participants and analysing 
the data are outlined and the ethical considerations as well as the trustworthiness and 
credibility of the research are discussed. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the presentation of the 
results obtained from the interviews with the three participants, using discourse analysis 
as analytical method.  
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Chapter 5 comprises of a critical discussion and integration of the results and delineates 
the strengths and limitations of this study before concluding with recommendations for 
future research in the field of diagnostic labelling. 
 
As indicated, the attention will now shift to a discussion of the relevant literature and 
theories pertaining to diagnostic labelling. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations 
 
In the introduction, the aim of this study was identified as an exploration of the meaning-
construction processes that diagnostically labelled individuals engage in to promote 
positive perceptions of self in relation to others. An overview of the literature pertaining 
to diagnostic labels is presented here as a means to inform the pursuit of the research aim. 
 
Literature review 
 
The term labelling, as used in this study, is known by many names in scientific discourse, 
including categorising, typing or diagnosing, and refers to the sorting of people into 
classes that have social significance in that they offer some information or knowledge 
about the social, economic, medical, moral or any other form of status of its members 
(Lee & Craft, 2002; Rubington & Weinberg, 2008; Schur, 1971). Neurological, learning 
and psychiatric disorders can therefore be construed in these terms as diagnostic labels 
that distinguish a number of individuals with ‘shared’ characteristics or attributes and that 
offer some information about the medical or psychiatric status of its members (Barlow & 
Durand, 2005; Tomm & Sanders, 1983).  
 
Social cognition: The imperative for labels 
 
Social psychologists use terms such as categorisation, schemas and stereotypes to 
explicate the nature of the process referred to as labelling (Baron, Byrne & Branscombe, 
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2006; Devine, 1995). In short, they propose that a label or social category is formed 
through the cognitive process during which individuals build mental frameworks to 
organise and compact the vast amounts of information available on individuals, groups, 
behaviours, etc., and that represent all our knowledge and assumptions on this 
categorised subject. These mental frameworks are known as social schemas, whereas 
stereotypes refer to special types of schemas, and are defined as “cognitive frameworks 
that influence the processing of social information” (Baron et al., 2006, p. 571). 
Therefore, stereotypes are shorthand ways of evaluating, whether positive or negative, 
members of a categorised or labelled group by means of the traits they are assumed to 
share with this group. In other words, a person is stereotyped when he or she is found to 
be ‘guilty by association’ (of possessing traits x, y and z) through his or her membership 
to a labelled group.  
 
According to social psychologists, labelling or categorisation is regarded to be a crucial 
part of social living, as it significantly reduces the amount and complexity of social 
information with which we are confronted and it facilitates simpler communication 
between individuals (Baron et al., 2006; Devine, 1995). For instance, one could refer to a 
class of individuals with mutually agreed upon characteristics when describing a 
particular individual to a friend. For example, a toddler is assumed by most to be a fairly 
short, energetic, immature, young and dependent person, and therefore one does not need 
to list all these traits every time you refer to a toddler.  
 
   
     13
This convenience is, however, accompanied by a potential snare in the form of reduced 
accuracy in social information processing (Baron et al., 2006). Besides differentiating 
individuals on the basis of their actual differences, labelling or social categorisation also 
frequently (maybe invariably) leads to the creation and maintenance of perceived (as 
opposed to actual) differences between individuals from different classes (Baron et al., 
2006; Devine, 1995).  
 
This view, then, supposes that labelling is 1) a linear process where the perceiver 
categorises a passive social actor; and 2) an inherently objective act that is based on real 
or intrinsic differences, but that frequently allows for subjective ‘errors’ (in the form of 
perceived differences) to creep in. These assumptions reflect basic limitations to 
understanding the process of labelling. Firstly, it does not take the reciprocal interaction 
between the labeller and the labelled individual into account when a specific label is 
negotiated (Becker, 2008; Rubington & Weinberg, 2008); and secondly, it underplays the 
political nature of the labelling process, which proposes that labelling always reflects 
ideological (and therefore temporary and subjective) distinctions of deviance (Schur, 
1971). These limitations are addressed through labelling theory and the interactionist 
perspective. 
 
The interactionist perspective 
 
When referring to the labelling of deviant behaviour, Rubington and Weinberg (2008) 
propose that there are two ways to approach deviance. The first approach assumes that 
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deviance can be distinguished from non-deviant behaviour on the basis of its objective, 
intrinsic properties that are perceived to deviate from the widespread norms of society. 
Therefore a specified act, according to the objectivist approach, is defined as deviant 
when it breaks a valued social norm, which evokes negative reactions from society, often 
in the form of punishment or corrective treatment, such as in the case of hospitalisation 
(Becker, 2008; Schur, 1971). Given, however, that society as a whole can never be 
regarded as purely homogenous and therefore never fully agree on social norms, 
Rubington and Weinberg (2008) note that an objectivist view of deviance does not 
provide a sufficient account of the intricacies of labelling. 
 
The second approach to deviance shifts the focus from the behavioural characteristics of 
the ‘deviant’ individual to the processes of social definition and social differentiation 
through which a cultural vocabulary is created that allows for individuals to be labelled 
‘criminal’, ‘psychotic’, ‘depressive’, etc. (Rubington & Weinberg, 2008; Schur, 1971). 
Becker (2008) credits scientific research for its role in creating deviance, by pointing to 
the fact that  
 
… whether talking about or studying those thought to have broken the 
rules, a construction of the “kinds of people” who violate rules is 
supported, shared, and transmitted for use in future communication about 
similar actors. The result is a cultural catalog of deviant social types  
(p. 7).  
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The interactionist approach rests on three assumptions (Rubington & Weinberg, 2008), 
the first one being that communicative interaction rests on shared symbols (including 
verbal and non-verbal language), which allow people to label each other and these labels 
consequently affect their behaviours towards each other (Schur, 1971). The second 
assumption is that these labels allow for the differentiation of deviant behaviour and 
consequently ‘deviant’ individuals (Becker, 2008). Finally, it is assumed that people’s 
behaviours are directed by these socially constructed deviance labels (Rubington & 
Weinberg, 2008).  
 
Note that the assumptions of the interactionist perspective as described above are very 
similar to those of social psychologists, in that labelling is seen as fundamentally human 
and necessary for social functioning; that it leads to the differentiation and stigmatisation 
of individuals; and that labels direct people’s behaviours. However, as opposed to the 
social psychological explanation that describes the act of labelling as a one-way process 
between the typer and the typed, the interactionist perspective highlights the interactive 
nature of labelling, where the ‘deviant’ and society enter a process of negotiation by 
means of actions and reactions (Rubington & Weinberg, 2008; Schur, 1971).  
 
In other words, the label and the dominant social discourses surrounding it informs 
others’ interactions with the ‘deviant’ individual, who is also affected by the label in the 
sense that the shared understanding of the label informs his or her interactions with others 
(Rubington & Weinberg, 2008). For instance, a man who is diagnosed with Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD) might find that others are very supportive and careful in 
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engaging him, and he might accept the support, but might also become irritated with their 
careful attitude towards him. His reactions to others’ initial interactions with him might 
then be taken as evidence that he is indeed helpless and irritable and therefore reinforce 
the MDD label.
1
   
 
These label-informed interactions feed off each other and can produce a variety of 
relational outcomes, including the self-fulfilling prophecy (as described in the preceding 
example), typecasting and recasting (Rubington & Weinberg, 2008). Typecasting occurs 
when a deviance label is so well known and accepted by society that reactions to such a 
labelled individual become automatic. For example, a community might immediately 
round up all known paedophiles living inside its borders as soon as a child goes missing, 
without any proof to substantiate that they are involved in the disappearance. Finally, 
recasting refers to societal reactions that are geared towards evoking label-incongruent 
behaviour in the ‘deviant’ individual. For instance, the MDD patient referred to above 
might feel encouraged to take on more responsibilities to counter helpless feelings and 
behaviour and thereby act in a way that is incongruent with the stereotype associated with 
MDD.  
 
The interactionist perspective therefore emphasises the tendency of labels to induce the 
behaviour it describes, via people’s reactions to the deviant label. Frank Tannenbaum 
describes it simply:  
                                                 
1
 It is important to note that this sequence of interactions can by no means be taken to be a linear cause and 
effect chain, as this would constitute a punctuation of the sequence of events where one action is assumed 
to cause another without recognising that they are in a circular causal loop. Thus it becomes futile to say 
that A caused B, as another punctuation would show that B caused A (Efran, Lukens & Lukens, 1990). 
This will be discussed in more detail in a later section. 
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The process of making the criminal ... is a process of tagging, defining, 
identifying, segregating, describing, emphasizing, and evoking the very 
traits that are complained of … The person becomes the thing he is 
described as being (Tannenbaum, as cited in Rubington & Weinberg, 
2008, p. 3).  
 
From this discussion it is apparent that the interactionist perspective contributes 
considerably to the understanding of labelling of deviance and its effects for the labelled 
individual and society. For instance, this perspective justly credits the important role of 
language and social discourse in constructing deviant behaviour through the labels we 
attach to ‘deviating’ individuals (Becker, 2008). Related to this, it acknowledges the 
cultural context in which deviant behaviour occurs, as various cultures differ in the types 
of valued and shunned behaviours and the vocabulary that correspond to these categories 
(Rubington & Weinberg, 2008).  
 
Although it recognises the interactive nature of the labelling process, the interactionist 
perspective is, however, still preoccupied with what leads to the labelling of a person and 
what the effects of labelling are. This inevitably leads to a punctuation of the interaction 
as a linear sequence where one party (e.g. society’s rules) causes the other (e.g. the 
breaker of society’s rules) to be viewed or acted to in a certain way. Keeney (1979) 
describes the dangers of such linear thinking:  
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… when we use a linear epistemology “we abstract from relationship and 
from the experiences of interaction to create ‘objects’ and to endow them 
with characteristics” … Ecosystemic epistemology requires that we undo 
these substantive abstractions and begin seeing patterns of relationships 
(p. 120).  
 
Therefore, in simple terms, such abstractions ignore the wholeness of the situation and 
reduce intricate patterns of relationships to overly simplistic linear ones. Although the 
interactionist perspective describes labelling as an interactive, societal process, this 
interactive description still punctuates a sequence of events between society and the 
labelled individual in a linear chain. This punctuated sequence is presented in the 
following contingencies: ‘deviant’ individuals behave in ways that necessitate society to 
create labels and therefore society creates labels that reinforce the ‘deviant’ behaviour of 
‘deviant’ individuals. Such linear reductions then lead to a situation of ‘which was first, 
the chicken or the egg?’. Kugelmass (1987), working in an educational setting, made a 
fitting statement in this regard:  
 
[T]he identification of someone as disturbed is a complex phenomenon that 
involves more than the child and the labeller. It is a subjective matter that 
involves the systems in which both operate, and the interactions between 
them (p.25). 
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In trying to understand labelling and its effect, it seems necessary to move beyond the 
labeller, the labelled and their interaction to consider the entire ecology in which labelling 
occurs. 
 
Towards an ecological perspective 
 
Efran et al. (1990) suggest that the pursuit of cause-effect chains  
 
… can be an unproductive mental game. Often we don’t need to traffic in 
causal attributions at all. We know what we like even when we don’t know 
why we like it. We know that when our brother was late, we got upset. We 
also know that when he apologized in a particular way, our distress 
vanished. That much we can be certain of, and it is important. The rest is 
often idle inference (p. 101).  
 
Efran et al. (1990) are also of the opinion that causes and effects are created by people 
through the subdivision of phenomena (including experience) into parts (Lifschitz & 
Fourie, 1990). Therefore, social experience and social living do not intrinsically exist 
with special laws determining that event A would lead to outcome B (Fourie, 1994). 
Rather, social systems constitute whole systems (Lifschitz & Fourie, 1990) where cause 
and effect is purposeless, in that its invention inevitably leads to tautologies. In other 
words “[a] description is turned into a purpose that is then asked to account for the 
description” (Efran et al., 1990, p. 99). A fitting example of such a tautology was 
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described above – the individual with MDD. This different model for conceptualising the 
world in terms of wholeness emerged within the ontological shift known as 
postmodernity and is known as ecosystemic epistemology. 
 
The postmodern explanation 
 
According to Sey (2006) “postmodernism is a broad term for many different approaches 
that set themselves up in opposition to the coherence and rationality of the modern 
world” (p. 524). From this description, one is able to infer that postmodernism 
incorporates a different way (from modernism) of understanding the world and the way 
in which people relate to it. Modernist approaches (such as positivism) emphasise the 
‘knowability’ of ultimate truths, which assume that researchers can transcend their own 
subjectivity and observe the world in an objective, value-free manner (Fourie, 1994; Sey, 
2006). Therefore, where modernity postulates the ‘discovery’ of natural and linear cause-
effect laws, postmodernism rejects the idea of a single truth, and rather acknowledges the 
possibilities of multiple and relative realities that are constructed by the meanings that 
people attach to events (Sey, 2006).  
 
Ecosystemic epistemology and social constructionism 
 
In keeping with the postmodern revolt against the reduction of reality to linear cause-
effect laws, second-order cybernetics posits that a system (such as a society with its 
categorised subsystems) is defined as being whole, self-referential and autopoietic, 
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among other elements (Becvar & Becvar, 2000). The wholeness of a system implies that 
any description of what is happening in the system is self-referential (Fourie, 1994). This 
simply means that, in systems, simultaneity of interactions occurs where the describer has 
to include himself or herself in that which he or she is explaining. Therefore, any 
“functions are functions of themselves … interactions … intersect with themselves [and] 
properties … compute themselves …” (cited in Becvar & Becvar, 2000, p. 79). Since 
there is ‘simultaneity of interactions’, the act of labelling behaviour as disordered is both 
the cause and the effect of the individual’s disordered behaviour that is being typed by 
the label, and the same is true for the ‘disordered’ individual’s behaviour towards others 
and others’ behaviour towards him or her.  
 
Given this explanation of systems, and if one accepts that society as a system functions as 
a whole system (Fourie, 1994; Lifschitz & Fourie, 1990), it becomes clear that simplified 
and reductionistic explanations of diagnostic labels and its causes and effects are 
irrelevant and even distracting. As Efran et al. (1990) comment:  
 
[E]xplanations attempt to condense and encapsulate still larger living 
patterns. In the mental health field, such condensations erroneously 
amplify the determinative importance of particular incidents over 
everyday drift. They yield a false picture. In life as it is lived, all 
successive moments “count” – not just the special few that are 
embroidered into our narrative tapestry (p. 92). 
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In keeping with this argument, Kugelmass (1987) argues that diagnosing a person and 
thereby labelling him or her as deviant should move away from seeking the cause of 
symptomatic ‘diseases’ within individuals and rather place the behaviour in its proper 
ecological context.  
 
For instance, referring to ADHD, Du Plessis and Strydom (1999), Rafalovich (2005) and 
Reid (1996) highlight the observation that ‘ADHD children’ only exhibit impairment in 
attention and behaviour in some situations (usually school), whereas at other times (such 
as when they are immersed in a stimulating activity) they are virtually undistinguishable 
from their ‘normal’ peers. This observation highlights the importance of the social 
environment in which the problem behaviour occurs. The symptom (deviant behaviour) 
therefore becomes a sign of “discordance” in the system in which it is imbedded 
(Kugelmass, 1987, p. 19).  
 
Symptoms as functions of stability 
 
This idea of symptoms as communicative signals of the nature and workings of the 
interpersonal relationship systems such as the family, community or even nation is one 
that has received a lot of attention from systems thinkers and family therapists (e.g. 
Haley, 1963; Keeney, 1979; Tomm & Sanders, 1983; Watzlawick, Bavelas & Jackson, 
1967). Keeney (1979) describes symptomatic behaviour as relationship metaphors, thus 
highlighting its communicative function as a compounded illustration of what is 
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happening in the relationship. In addition to this, Haley (1963) suggests that symptoms or 
deviant behaviour, in fact all behaviour, should be seen to be strategic in nature.  
 
In other words, symptomatic behaviours are tactics in human relationships, in that these 
behaviours serve a particular function for the person performing it, as well as in the 
relationship system that forms the context for its manifestation (Haley, 1963; Watzlawick 
et al., 1967). In simple terms, symptoms can be described as “a way of dealing with, 
perhaps disarming, another person” (Haley, 1963, p. 5).  
 
The idea of symptoms as strategies and relationship metaphors has the important 
implication that the symptoms (or deviant behaviour) have a stabilising effect in the 
relationship system. This is evident in Keeney’s observation that the treatment and 
subsequent relief of symptomatic behaviour, without restructuring the relationship, often 
leads to “a transfer of symptomatic expression to another site [in the system]” (Keeney, 
1979, p. 120). Tomm and Sanders (1983) argue that labelling such deviant behaviour, i.e. 
diagnosing the ‘identified patient’ (IP), actually risks stabilising the system, such that the 
IP becomes the scapegoat and regular (or invariable) site of symptomatic expression. 
This problem is compounded by the tendency of diagnostic labels to limit subsequent 
behaviours, as the directive nature of diagnostic labels serves to inform family and 
therapist observations and behaviours toward the IP (Tomm & Sanders, 1983).  
 
Efran et al. (1990) make a similar statement about the restrictions of diagnostic labels, for 
“in their quest to be precise – to pin problems down in objective, concrete terms – people 
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are labeled, problems are named, and flexibility is lost” (p. 89). Therefore, a pattern of 
relating is formed or reinforced by the way the problem behaviour is framed through the 
application of a diagnostic label, and alternative ways of framing the problem and thus 
behaving become pseudo-impossibility. It would seem then that the power of diagnostic 
labels to ‘disable’ emanates from the communicative value they serve in order to make 
sense of the shared reality of the role-players in the ‘problem’ system. 
 
Social foundations: The importance of language in constructing reality 
 
The value of recognising the communicative value of diagnostic labels can best be made 
salient by considering the recent shift towards acknowledging the constructive power of 
language. By shifting their focus to language, social constructionists recognised the 
important role of language in shaping social reality (Fourie, 1994). More specifically, 
social constructionism postulates that reality is constructed through a social process 
characterised by mutual agreement between people on the nature of reality, whereby 
shared meanings, beliefs and values are attained (Young & Collin, 2004).  
 
In achieving this agreement, Sey (2006) suggests that linguistic structure plays an 
important mediating role in constructing reality. It is through language and the way it is 
put to use that realities are shaped and transmitted from one generation to the next 
through a system of shared meanings, known as culture. The social constructionist 
epistemology links very closely to the postmodern worldview, in that the idea that 
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different realities are created by means of a social process of shared meanings inherently 
allows for the possibility of multiple and relative realities. 
 
This shift in thinking came about with the consideration of the ideas of Bateson in family 
therapy, who suggests that power is a social construction (Cecchin, 1992). This power, 
which families are said to battle for, was no longer seen as an entity to possess, but rather 
became a creation of people relating to one another in a specific context and who act as if 
it exists. For example, the power an authoritarian husband holds over his wife cannot be 
divorced from her submissiveness and the mutual agreement between them regarding the 
nature of their relationship. Each play a role in constructing that power through what 
Maturana (1974) calls structural coupling. This means that families are organised the way 
they are because each member couples his or her behaviour to fit with the family 
environment.  
 
Therefore, everything that happens within a family happens only because it could happen, 
and any attempt to explain what happened is an act of fiction. Thus, people’s 
explanations of events are not the events themselves, but represent specific ways of 
organising those events, which depend on the vantage point from which those events are 
observed. 
 
Therefore, social constructionists reject the idea of an underlying structure or order in any 
phenomenon being studied (Andersen, 1992; Cecchin, 1992; Fourie, 1994; Hoffman, 
1992). For instance, this view would suggest that any structured patterns observed in a 
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family are not inherent qualities of that family, but rather constructed through social 
negotiation via the medium of language. Thus, the order we observe, is the product of a 
social process whereby meanings are created (Fourie, 1994) and that can and do change 
over time. In other words, because our observations are informed by the language we use 
to describe them, these observations will always reflect political and ideological power 
relations among those who describe and those who are described (Hoffman, 1992), and 
may change relative to changes in society.  
 
In a similar vein, Efran and Clarfield (1992) argue that from a social constructionist 
viewpoint, it is true that no-one can know an objective reality, but that everyone has (and 
is entitled to have) a preferred way to conceptualise reality. Such a reality should, 
however, not be mistaken for the truth, but acknowledged as one of multiple (value-
laden) truths.  
 
Linking to the systemic idea of observers as self-referential systems, Frugerri (1992) 
posits that any knowledge about an individual’s system is seen as an ongoing, self-
referential construction that relies on the observer’s description of the system through 
subjective language and thus relating what he or she sees in terms of his or her previous 
experiences. The observer therefore creates and becomes part of the system he or she 
describes, purely through his or her act of observing and describing through language 
(Fourie, 1994). This act of observing and describing then also changes the observer’s 
relationship to the system in a continuous fashion as this is an interactional, circular 
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process in which each act of observation adds something new to the system (Fourie, 
1994; Frugerri, 1992).  
 
In explaining this idea of self-reference, Andersen (1992) holds that 
 
… we do not relate to life ‘itself’ but to our understanding of it … [and 
furthermore] we strongly participate in creating our understanding of life 
… [and consequently] there are as many versions of a situation as there 
are persons to understand it (p. 61). 
 
Thus the observer can no longer be seen as separate from and objective with regard to 
that which he or she describes. This is referred to as the organisational closure of self as a 
system (Becvar & Becvar, 2000), meaning that one cannot observe the world without 
referring to your own subjective experiences of the world. 
 
Given that each person relates to his or her own version of reality, Efran and Clarfield 
(1992) note that it is tempting to argue that social constructionism amounts to solipsism 
(i.e. that because there is no objective truth, there is no standard against which to evaluate 
the validity of any assumptions about reality). It should, however, be kept in mind that 
any person’s assumptions about reality is situated within a social domain (Cecchin, 
1992), meaning that the assumptions we make of reality are mediated by the assumptions 
of others as well as the broader social narratives that set the boundaries of our 
assumptions of reality (Efran & Clarfield, 1992).  
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Cecchin (1992) makes a similar observation and argues that people not only construct 
meanings to make sense of reality through social interaction, but also that the significance 
of such interaction becomes a way of defining the self in a relationship with the world. 
People’s interactions (mediated through language) are thus seen to be efforts to construct 
realities, which hold with it the limits and opportunities we are faced with as individuals 
related to that reality.  
 
Language: Both friend and foe 
 
Since the way we define or frame our interactions with others has a big impact on what 
we recognise the possibilities for our behaviour to be, it follows that language becomes 
the crucial element in creating and resolving problematic systems (Efran et al., 1990). 
Anderson et al. (1986) describe the way an ecology of ideas are formed around  
 
… the shared, cognitive, and linguistic discourse through which we derive 
meaning, and out of which we create the realities of coordinated action 
systems. Through language individuals interact with and coordinate 
behaviour with others in a variety of ways. This can even be ways that are 
thought of as problems (p. 6).  
 
Therefore, a person’s behaviour only becomes deviant or problematic when it is 
languaged or framed as deviant or problematic (Fourie, 1994; Terre Blanche, 1998). For 
instance, any person’s fear response to spiders, heights, water or his or her own shadow is 
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merely a bodily reaction to objects or situations. The body merely responds to a stimulus 
without evaluating the appropriateness or intensity of the response. Efran et al. (1990) 
argue that “fears only seem disproportionate to danger when they belong to another 
person or are evaluated from another perspective” (p. 91).  
 
Therefore, the person only becomes a phobic when his or her behaviour is evaluated from 
an outside perspective and framed in a problematic fashion, i.e. labelled as disordered. In 
this way agreement is reached that the person has a problem and a ‘coordinated action 
system’ forms around the identified problem – what Anderson et al. (1986) call a 
problem-determined system, where the organisation of the system and the IP’s role in it 
are altered by the admission that there is now a problem.  
 
An example of such a problem-determined system would be the organised system that 
forms when a family comes to the conclusion that their child’s bedwetting is a problem 
that needs to be dealt with. The child’s bedwetting could become a problem when there is 
disagreement between the parents on how to manage this behaviour. This might raise 
issues in the marital relationship regarding who is in charge and who takes control over 
which scenarios and might also lead to parental conflict. The bedwetting behaviour might 
escalate as the mother and father present with a disjointed reaction to the bedwetting as 
each attempts to assert their parental and marital authority. In turn the child might 
become confused with regard to what is expected of him. The mother might insist that the 
behaviour is normal and might resent her husband’s suggestion to seek professional help, 
whereas the husband might blame his wife for not caring enough to do something to help 
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the child. Thus the initial agreement that the bedwetting needs to be managed determined 
a distinct pattern of organisation in the family system around the child’s bedwetting – the 
problem determined the workings of the system (Anderson et al., 1986).   
 
Critical approaches (including structuralist, post-structuralist and Foucaultian theory) also 
highlight the unequivocal role of language in creating the realities that we so easily take 
for granted (Fourie, 1994; Terre Blanche, 1998). For instance Althusser (as cited in Terre 
Blanche, 1998, p. 140) describes the means by which Western democracies are produced 
and maintained by “Repressive State Apparatuses”, such as prisons, institutions, etc., in 
conjunction with “Ideological State Apparatuses”, such as the medical profession, which 
depend on words to exert domination and submission among the powerful and the 
powerless classes: 
 
…The realities of the class struggle are ‘represented’ by ‘ideas’ which are 
‘represented’ by words. In scientific and philosophical reasoning, the 
words (concepts, categories) are instruments of knowledge. But in 
political, ideological and philosophical struggle, the words are also 
weapons, explosives or tranquilizers and poisons. Occasionally the whole 
class struggle may be summed up in the struggle for one word against 
another word. Certain words struggle among themselves as enemies. 
Other words are the site of an ambiguity: the stake in a decisive but 
undecided battle (Terre Blanche, 1998, p. 140). 
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While these approaches emphasise the importance of the actual words, phrases and other 
units of language that construct the reality of some class (such as psychiatric patients) at 
the will of another class (such as doctors and psychologists), Searle and others (as cited in 
Terre Blanche, 1998) see the power of language to reside in “speech acts” (p. 144) rather 
than in words. Terre Blanche (1998) describes the process of a conversation to illustrate 
the importance of the interaction between ‘speaker’ and ‘hearer’, which affords words 
their power. As such the speaker needs to mean something and the hearer needs to 
understand what is meant for communication to take place. 
 
Apter (as cited in Kugelmass, 1987) illustrates the role of such interactions in creating 
deviant behaviour as 
 
… a disparity between an individual’s abilities and the demands and 
expectations of the environment – a “failure to match” between the child 
and the system. It is not the child alone or the environment alone that 
causes emotional disturbance. Rather it is the interaction between them 
that creates a discordance and disrupts the system (p. 19). 
 
This description highlights the importance of the framing of the child’s behaviour 
through environmental expectations. The child needs to behave in a certain manner, and 
the social ecology needs to evaluate this behaviour against certain expectations in order 
to define a problem, usually in the child. Language is the medium through which such 
expectations are known and shared.  
   
     32
From an ecological perspective then, language becomes the medium for creating and 
resolving problems (Fourie, 1994). When it is said that language creates the disorder a 
person is said to exhibit, it is not meant that such behaviour does not actually exist. 
Rather it is suggested that such behaviour is merely behaviour, which, in the 
interpersonal context or ecology it occurs, is framed as problematic by the language and 
shared meanings attached to it (Efran et al., 1990). 
 
Although the social constructionist view posits that clients’ problems are situated in a 
system of language, it is false to assume that in psychotherapy we as psychologists only 
deal with interpretations of, or metaphors for, their ‘real problems’ (Efran & Clarfield, 
1992). This is because the idea of different hierarchical levels in human functioning such 
as overt and covert messages and superficial symptoms versus the deeper underlying 
causes is rejected by social constructionists. Instead Efran and Clarfield (1992) argue that 
each of these ‘levels’ could act as a context for another and therefore has equal horizontal 
standing as opposed to hierarchical vertical standings.  
 
Diagnostic labels then are not merely the surface concept that refers to an underlying 
problem, but rather become the context for the ‘problem’, in that the discourses 
accommodating them frame the experiences of the individual in a specific (usually 
dysfunctional) manner. In another interpersonal context, however, the same ‘problematic’ 
behaviour might be framed as highly desirable, adaptable and endearing, depending on 
the shared meanings and language used to evaluate the behaviour.  
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Cecchin (1992) argues a similar point in claiming that we not only negotiate the limits of 
our personal agency through social interaction, but that it is also through such interactions 
that we can extend our definitions of self and the problems we face in order to offer 
possibilities for more personal agency. Linking to this idea, Andersen (1992) postulates 
that psychotherapeutic conversation can be defined as an individual’s search for new 
descriptions and definitions of the self that he or she would be most comfortable with.  
 
Ecological and narrative conceptualisations of psychotherapy 
 
The goal of psychotherapy, from a social constructionist viewpoint, is to utilise the 
discrepancies in meaning that exist between the therapist’s and client’s descriptions of 
reality to overcome the limitations of old narratives and co-construct new and different 
stories with more possibilities for clients (Cecchin, 1992; Fourie, 1994).  
 
For instance, consider the predicament a woman would find herself in when a certain 
interpretation of her religious convictions excludes or contradicts the possibility of being 
true to her sexuality. Such contradictions constitute the problems that individuals are 
faced with, and psychotherapy, from a social constructionist viewpoint, aims at enlarging 
the boundaries of the playing field to make space for the individual’s apparently 
contradictory preferences.  
 
By conversing in a manner that illuminates the different ways that the therapist and client 
define the problem, a context is created where both can negotiate a new frame that 
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represents the shared meanings that co-evolved between therapist and client (Andersen, 
1992; Cecchin, 1992; Frugerri, 1992). The woman’s contradiction described above then 
clears up when her definition of herself or her situation is expanded to integrate her 
previously conflicting preferences in a harmonious way. Therefore, our problems arise in 
a social domain through language, but it is also through language that we can reframe our 
problematic definitions of self in order to construct solutions. 
 
Psychotherapy then becomes an endeavour to restructure the problematic system 
(Keeney, 1979) by reframing a person’s behaviour (via societal discourses) in a way that 
allows for better outcomes to become readily apparent (Efran et al., 1983) and that alters 
the relatedness between the IP and others in the system. If the goal of psychotherapy is to 
utilise discourses to reframe personal narratives and extend the limitations placed on our 
agency, it could be argued that people who have adapted to their diagnostic labels 
somehow reframed the meanings that they attached to their ‘problem behaviours’ to 
allow for more personal agency and extended the limitations placed on their personal 
freedom by the previous meanings they attached to these behaviours. 
 
In other words, just as diagnostic labels have the potential effect of making a person 
define himself or herself as a ‘deviant’, ‘victim’ or ‘outcast’, they could also, depending 
on the discourses employed by the individual and the way they are related to each other, 
serve to define the individual as a ‘hero’, ‘conqueror’ or ‘victor’.  
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For instance, a man with the diagnosis of anxiety disorder is faced with a multitude of 
discourses surrounding his diagnosis. Firstly, gender discourses accompany the fact that 
he is a man and advocates that men should exude rationality, courage, masculinity, 
fearlessness and the like. Secondly, medical discourses, which accompany anxiety 
disorders, suggest that phobias are exaggerated, irrational and unfounded fears. When 
utilising these discourses in framing his experience of being diagnosed as a ‘phobic’, he 
can easily define himself as a ‘wimp’, since he is excessively fearful, overreacts when 
faced with the object he fears and, in addition, his actions seem to be irrational and 
illogical.  
 
Therefore, the discourses, when organised in this way, present the man with an emotional 
contradiction, in that his fears cannot be reconciled with his masculinity, which would 
likely heighten his experience of distress. However, by reorganising these discourses, the 
meanings he attaches to his ‘disordered’ behaviour can be framed in a more useful way, 
as when he might recognise that he is faced with most men’s biggest fear, namely being 
emasculated by a ‘mental disorder’, and might rise to face that fear head-on. This 
reframed explanation of his experience serves to expand the limitations placed on his 
masculinity by the former framing and consequently resolves the emotional contradiction 
that existed before. He can now define himself as a very brave man that stood up to and 
conquered the fear of being emasculated by an anxiety disorder.  
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Defining the self: A never-ending, ever-evolving story 
 
Given the role of language (in this case, specifically the language surrounding diagnostic 
labels) in constructing interpersonal realities, it follows that language also holds 
important implications for the definition of self of an individual. When referring to the 
notion of self, social constructionists reject the modernist tendency of defining the self as 
a structure-determined inner reality, consisting of emotions, cognitions, etc., and that 
assumes a fairly rigid form over the lifespan.  
 
Rather, according to Hoffman (1992), the self is viewed as a continually evolving entity 
that waxes and wanes over time, much like a “stretch of moving history” (p. 10). She 
maintains that any person’s experience of himself or herself is imbedded in a relational 
field where changes in others’ reactions to him or her affect the way he or she 
experiences the ‘self’, and vice versa. Therefore, the ‘self’ is described in terms of 
circular interactions that cause it to evolve and change shape over time.  
 
Andersen (1992) also highlights the interactional nature of the concept of self and 
maintains that by using language, people express and construct their being by defining 
themselves in discussions with themselves and others. Thus, any interactions or events 
are related to one’s construction of the self through the language that is used to describe 
oneself in relation to such events. Andersen (1992) goes so far as to say that “talking with 
oneself and/or others is a way of defining oneself. In this sense the language we use 
makes us who we are in the moment we use it” (p. 64).  
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Related to the concept of self as a continuously evolving process, the idea of normal 
human development also takes a different meaning when viewed from a constructionist 
viewpoint. Hoffman (1992) posits that the traditional psychological given that normal 
human development occurs in developmental stages is unwarranted in that there is great 
variability regarding human development and to single out one ‘optimal’ route is to step 
into the same trap of a singular truth. Thus, given the scientific discourses on diagnostic 
labels, it is easy to come to the conclusion that such labels refer to ‘real’ underlying 
conditions that manifest in behavioural and interactional disturbances and that are the 
consequences of a deviation from the optimal route of development.  
 
Such a conclusion, however, ignores the crucial fact that the ‘disorders’ that are spoken 
about are products of the linguistic activities that occur between agents of the institutional 
and cultural contexts that carry the values and expectations of society at large (Hoffman, 
1992). Therefore, it is through cultural and institutional politics that neurological, 
learning and psychiatric disorders are defined and framed in specific (read disabling) 
ways. Hoffman (1992) citing Gergen, highlights the trap of generalising the 
developmental flow of human functioning: 
 
[I]t is becoming increasingly apparent to investigators in [the domain of 
social constructionism] that developmental trajectories over the lifespan 
are highly variable; neither with respect to psychological functioning nor 
overt conduct does there appear to be transhistorical generality in 
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lifespan trajectory … A virtual infinity of developmental forms seem 
possible ... (p. 11). 
 
Given this view of the self, and the multitude of developmental pathways open to people, 
it seems to open new avenues for thinking about the effects that diagnostic labels have on 
those people diagnosed with them. Scientific discourse seems to be filled with debate on 
the reasons for using or not using diagnostic labels, as if the labels themselves have 
intrinsic qualities that make them good or bad.  
 
Also, in debating on the value of diagnostic labels it is assumed that the effects of 
diagnostic labels are invariably experienced the same across society, ignoring the idea 
that people construct their realities in a continuous process of framing and reframing their 
experiences by playing with the discourses available to them (Andersen, 1992; Anderson 
& Goolishian, 1992). This is because any discourse, by way of its interactional and 
thereby political nature, promotes the validity of some idea over another and the 
legitimacy of some topic over another (Hoffman, 1992).  
 
It can therefore be said that people are immersed in writing the stories of their lives. They 
borrow words, sentences, phrases and concepts from a cultural stockpile; they string them 
together, cut them apart, format their meanings and paste them in varying orders. While 
what is told at a specific moment in time might be a story of romance, an epic tale of 
struggle or an horrific battle for life, it should be remembered that the genre cannot be 
named or fixed until the last page is turned. 
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Positive outcomes of labelling? 
 
It would seem from the foregoing discussion on labelling and its effects that authors 
agree on the fact that diagnostic labels have dire consequences for the individuals being 
labelled. These consequences can be grouped into three categories, namely that:  
1) diagnostic labels can lead to individuals being stigmatised according to the 
generic characteristics to which the label refers;  
2) diagnostic labels inform people’s expectations of labelled individuals, thereby 
affecting the ways they relate to these individuals and vice versa. This can 
lead to self-fulfilling prophecies where the diagnostic label evokes the 
behaviour it represents; and  
3) diagnostic labels tend to frame our thoughts on a specific phenomenon, 
thereby restricting the recognition of alternative ways to frame this 
phenomenon.  
 
In other words, diagnostic labels tend to frame symptomatic behaviours in debilitative, 
intrapersonal terms – a disorder that afflicts the person. It is apparent that these 
consequences are not independent effects of diagnostic labelling but overlapping and 
intertwined processes that are punctuated in a certain way. 
 
If one accepts the idea that language is the crucial element in the creation of disordered 
and deviant behaviour, it should follow that the consequences of diagnostic labelling as 
described above can be framed as potentially positive outcomes of labelling. In fact, Reid 
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(1996) suggests that diagnostic labels (referring specifically to ADHD) serve a 
therapeutic function, as they allow the afflicted parties to attribute a cause to the problem 
behaviour and consequently get a grasp on the situation, which enhances feelings of 
competency. Furthermore, diagnostic labels provide a means for appropriating services 
(such as additional educational assistance) and protection (such as social and/or disability 
grants) that might not have been available otherwise.  
 
Herman and Miall (1990) describe a similar set of positive outcomes (as experienced by 
respondents in their study) of stigma related to diagnostic labels. They found that 
diagnostic labels can lead to 
1) the legitimation of deviant behaviour, thereby excusing these individuals from 
personal responsibility for their actions, as these are now attributed to the 
disorder. People therefore tend to place less blame on psychiatric patients for 
their past and present deviant acts, which could ease feelings of personal guilt;  
2) exemption from usual social roles and obligations, meaning that society’s 
expectations of these individuals are somewhat altered or reduced, thereby 
potentially reducing stress related to social expectations;  
3) access to adaptive opportunities, meaning that labelled individuals learn to 
utilise their diagnostic labels in order to get access to shelter, health care, 
food, etc.;  
4) the strengthening of family relationships, in that the family unites to support 
the ‘disordered’ family member; and  
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5) experiences of personal growth, where the labelled individual gets to learn 
something of himself or herself and his or her behaviour through self-
reflective techniques and analysing people’s reactions toward him or her 
(Herman & Miall, 1990).  
 
Instead of viewing these outcomes as separate positive outcomes to the negative ones 
outlined above, these can be seen to be alternative ways of framing the experiences of 
individuals who have been diagnosed as mentally disordered. Herman and Miall (1990) 
duly state that “the possession of a discredited attribute can be a positive experience 
dependent on actor definitions and actions” (p. 264).  
 
For instance, 1) can be seen as a positive framing of the view that diagnostic labels are 
debilitative; 2), 3) and 4) as positive frames for the view that diagnostic labels lead to 
negative reactions and secondary gain, which reinforce the disordered behaviour, for the 
symptomatic behaviour can be defined as an asset that provides adaptive opportunities, 
reduces personal stress and mends family ties; and 5) as a positive frame for the view that 
diagnostic labels tend to crystallise the problematic organisation of the system by 
identifying a scapegoat or IP, because the personal growth can lead to changes in the way 
the labelled individual relates to others.  
 
Herman and Miall (1990) mention a potential societal gain of labelling: “[L]abelling an 
individual deviant may in fact conventionalise deviant behavior and return the individual 
to a more acceptable way of acting …” (p. 264). A contemporary example of this 
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outcome is the current ‘normalisation’ of same-sex relationships around the world, where 
numerous countries are contemplating the legalisation of gay marriages. Thus, same-sex 
sexuality is in the process of being accepted as a legitimate and conventional life path 
rather than as deviance or abnormality. 
 
Depending on the labelled individual’s acceptance of them, all these positive frames can 
alter the individual’s position in the problem-determined system, such that the system’s 
organisation is altered, with the symptoms possibly becoming obsolete. Therefore, 
instead of weighing the positive and negative consequences of diagnostic labelling 
against each other, the focus can be shifted towards the manner in which labelled 
individuals construct and frame their experiences and potential outcomes utilising the 
social discourses surrounding a particular diagnostic label.  
 
The idea is that discourses are discourses and behaviours are behaviours; the difference 
that makes a difference, however, is the way these are put together and related to each 
other to construct a reality of experience where the identified problem is no longer a 
barrier to adaptation, but a lesson learned in construing alternatives. This holds the 
important implication that due consideration be given to the dominant discourses that 
accompany any given diagnostic label, and the way in which they inform people’s 
understanding of neurological, learning or psychiatric ‘problems’ when constructing their 
worlds with its limits, so that these assumptions can be challenged. Such an examination 
of assumptions would constitute the critical role that Young and Collin (2004) ascribe to 
social constructionism. 
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Social constructionism: A critical stance 
 
In explaining the critical stance that social constructionism takes, Young and Collin 
(2004) contend that “most social constructionisms overtly challenge orthodox, positivist 
assumptions” (p. 377) and also cite Gergen saying that “social constructionism asks a 
new set of questions – often evaluative, political, and pragmatic – regarding the choices 
one makes” (p. 377).  
 
When adopting such a critical stance it is important to consider the important distinction 
that Andersen and Goolishian (1992) draw between local meanings and dialogue and 
broadly held cultural sensibilities, the former referring to “the language, the meaning, 
and the understanding developed between persons in dialogue…” (p. 33). Andersen and 
Goolishian (1992) recognise the importance of local meanings to be situated in the fact 
that “there is a range of experiences and a way of knowing these experiences that is 
sufficiently different from ‘knower’ to ‘knower’…” (p. 33). It therefore becomes 
apparent that the effects of diagnostic labels cannot be abstracted from the context in 
which they are understood by the person who is labelled.  
 
Taking these points into consideration, it becomes futile, in my opinion, to debate the 
goodness or badness of any diagnostic label. Rather, I choose to acknowledge that each 
participant’s reality is constructed by the bestowal and/or acceptance of the diagnostic 
label, the way his or her social world organises itself in relation to that label (i.e. how do 
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others react to the label and how does it affect his or her relationships?), and 
consequently the meanings he or she attaches to this label.  
 
The way all these experiences are put together and framed would constitute whether the 
diagnostic label is experienced as good or bad, and whether it would lead to alternative 
and adaptive outcomes for the labelled individual. Considering the foregoing discussion 
on psychotherapy as a collaborative attempt to reframe a problem in order to allow for 
flexibility and alternatives, it would seem hypocritical of psychotherapists to frame 
diagnostic labels as inherently restrictive, stigmatising and unproductive, as this framing 
itself is restrictive and inflexible. 
 
As Efran et al. (1990) propose, one can get caught up in ideological debate on complex 
issues of trivial importance when one takes too serious the idea that certain distinctions 
are so fundamental that they can yield permanent objective truths. Therefore, scientific 
endeavour in this view ceases to be a quest for the question that would yield the answer. 
Rather, the goal becomes to ask questions in such a way as to open new doors for 
alternative answers to become a possibility, steering clear of those absolutes that are no 
better than wool over the eyes.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As mentioned before, the aim of this study is to explore the ways in which individuals 
construct meaning from their experiences of adapting to their diagnostic labels by 
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reframing these labels as interpersonal metaphors. Accordingly, the focus falls on the 
meanings participants ascribe to their diagnostic labels and the implications that these 
meanings have for their perceived outcomes in various aspects of life. As discussed in 
this chapter, my assumption is that individuals collaborate in the construction of certain 
realities and that one cannot assume that one truth holds true for all.  
 
From a social constructionist point of view, my hope for this study was to raise the 
questions that challenge the dominant, ideological scientific discourses that still reign 
today. In other words, does a diagnostic label help the individual or hinder him or her; 
and are the outcomes of diagnosed individuals an implicit function of the stigmatising 
discourses that accompany their diagnostic labels, or are they functions of the way in 
which these discourses are organised into a frame for viewing reality?  
 
With these points in mind, the focus in Chapter 3 shifts to a description of the qualitative 
research design and its methods of data gathering and data analysis as the means to 
address the aims of this study.  
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Chapter 3 – Research Strategy and Guiding Methods 
 
Having discussed the aim of the study and reviewed the literature pertaining to diagnostic 
labelling, the focus in this chapter shifts to an exposition of the guiding research methods 
and processes to achieve the research aim. A qualitative approach to the investigation has 
been posed and is described in terms of its applicability to direct the research endeavour. 
In addition, the venture into the realm of application is presented with reference to the 
identification of suitable participants, the means of collecting data, as well as the analysis 
strategy employed. Finally, the chapter concludes with an exposition of relevant ethical 
considerations as well as a clarification of the credibility and trustworthiness of the study. 
 
The qualitative research design 
 
Considering the aim of the study, namely an exploration of the meaning-construction 
processes that individuals diagnosed with neurological, learning or psychiatric disorders 
engage in by reframing their diagnostic labels as interpersonal metaphors, it was deemed 
to fit well with a qualitative research approach. In support of this fit, Durrheim (2006) is 
of the opinion that “[q]ualitative methods allow the researcher to study selected issues in 
depth, openness, and detail as they identify and attempt to understand the categories of 
information that emerge from the data” (p. 47). Thus, qualitative research is not 
concerned with the identification of cause-effect relationships, but rather enquires about 
individuals’ lived experiences, thereby attempting to obtain a meaningful understanding 
of those individuals’ experiences.  
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There are, however, differences in the ways that qualitative research is approached by 
different researchers. Murphy and Dingwall (2003) outline the diverging viewpoints 
among qualitative researchers regarding the nature, goals and purpose of qualitative 
research endeavours, arguing that there seems to be widespread disagreement regarding 
the role of qualitative research within the scientific community.  
 
Some qualitative researchers contend that there is an objective reality that can be known 
through systematic and rigorous observation and enquiry, and that two different 
observers, when placed in the same context and view a situation from the same angle 
would produce the same account of that event, given that their observations were 
scientific. This is known as the realist approach and constitutes one end of the continuum 
explaining the role of qualitative research (Murphy & Dingwall, 2003).  
 
While subtle realism also accepts the notion of an external reality, it differs from realism 
in that supporters of this approach acknowledge that observers of this reality are 
constrained by their “cultural-biological lens” through which their observations are made 
(Murphy & Dingwall, 2003, p. 13). Despite their recognition that different accounts of 
this external reality can co-exist, subtle realists are of the opinion that some observations 
and accounts are better than others, in that they are more valid by way of rigorous testing 
and evaluation.  
 
Finally, on the other end of the continuum lies the relativist perspective, the followers of 
which contend that no-one can know or understand an external reality seperate from his 
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or her personal biases and agendas, and that “nothing exists independently of the 
language and perspectives that bring phenomena into being” (Ballinger, 2006, p. 240). 
This approach to qualitative research clearly embraces the postmodern ontology 
discussed in Chapter 2 and advocates that qualitative research should focus on the ways 
in which “commonly shared worldviews are constructed and come to be accepted” 
(Ballinger, 2006, p. 240). Given my interest in the social discourses that accompany 
diagnostic labels and the way in which they shape the frames by which labelled 
individuals construct their realities, it seems logically consistent that a relativist approach 
to qualitative research be adopted here. 
 
Regarding the nature of qualitative research, authors generally argue that qualitative 
research is holistic, naturalistic and inductive in nature (Durrheim, 2006; Murphy & 
Dingwall, 2003). The idea of qualitative research being naturalistic is that it is concerned 
with phenomena or experiences as they occur in real-life or everyday situations, without 
manipulation by the researcher.  
 
Its holistic nature refers to the assumption that human experiences cannot be 
meaningfully understood by studying isolated variables or events, but rather by studying 
these events or phenomena as they occur within a wider and meaningful context 
(Durrheim, 2006). Murphy and Dingwall (2003) make a similar argument, stating that 
qualitative research embraces complexity by placing it at the centre of its enquiries, rather 
than controlling and simplifying it.  
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Finally, the inductive nature of qualitative research is expressed in its preoccupation with 
detailed and specific information gathering and analyses in an attempt to uncover themes 
or narratives regarding participants’ lived experiences (Durrheim, 2006). It therefore 
becomes apparent that qualitative research steers clear of rigidly determined research 
plans and opts for flexibility in engaging the data that emerge. 
 
Finlay (2006, p. 3) uses the metaphor of a “research journey” to describe the nature of 
qualitative research and proposes that it is an endeavour aimed at exploring social 
realities, and therefore warns against the adoption of fixed ideas about the content or 
outcomes of the research. While preliminary ideas are set out to guide researchers in their 
projects, qualitative researchers seek to remain open to new leads, allowing the emerging 
data to guide their interpretations (Finlay, 2006; Murphy & Dingwall, 2003; Steward, 
2006), rather than fitting the data into a predefined framework. It is therefore widely 
argued that qualitative research relies on inductive reasoning (Finlay, 2006), but Murphy 
and Dingwall (2003) argue that there is often an interplay involved between inductive 
and deductive reasoning in qualitative projects:  
 
[Data analysis] occurs in parallel with data collection so that the 
researcher is continuously able to test, refine, and elaborate propositions 
developed in earlier stages of research. Theoretical statements are 
modified in the light of new observations [inductive element] and 
observations are sought to extend or modify existing or emerging theory 
[deductive element] (p. 23).  
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This then also highlights the central role that the researcher plays in constructing the 
knowledge obtained through qualitative enquiry. Murphy and Dingwall (2003), for 
instance, argue that any research account is inevitably an artful product, in that the author 
of such an account utilises various linguistic devices to promote the trustworthiness of a 
specific perspective or interpretation, because the author cannot escape from including 
and emphasising certain aspects of the vast observational field over others.  
 
The researcher’s engagement in the research setting inevitably changes that setting, 
thereby making it impossible to inquire about people’s experiences as they occur 
naturally (Murphy & Dingwall, 2003). These authors, however, suggest that we can “seek 
to learn about their natural state from our examination of what changes have identifiably 
occurred in its transformation by our involvement” (p. 28). 
 
By acknowledging our limitations, as outsiders, to instantaneously understand the settings 
we intend to study, Murphy and Dingwall (2003) suggest that qualitative researchers can 
avoid the pitfall of accepting its current organisation as absolute and through their 
engagement with the participants explore the question of “why things are one way rather 
than another” (p. 35). This tentative approach to the truth of a situation allows the 
researcher to formulate descriptions that represent the researcher’s take on the reality of 
that situation that might be different from the accepted version, and cannot be taken to be 
a reproduction of such a setting (Murphy & Dingwall, 2003).  
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Finlay (2006) further emphasises the importance of the nature of the relationship the 
researcher has with his or her participants. Not only is there a mutual perturbation 
between the researcher and his or her participants, but both are also informed by them 
being situated within wider socio-historical systems and culture, which has a bearing on 
the knowledge generated between them (Finlay, 2006). The qualitative researcher’s 
interest in the description of this relationship and the complex factors that bear on it, 
through a self-reflexive process, can yield important information on the way in which 
specific realities come to be (Murphy & Dingwall, 2003). These authors point out that 
while qualitative research focuses on description, such thick and detailed descriptions can 
themselves have explanatory power. 
 
Bearing this in mind, there seems to be a good fit with the postmodern and social 
constructionist views adopted in this study, for a qualitative approach lends itself to the 
exploration of individuals’ unique experiences, highlighting the influence of context and 
thereby being open to the possibility of multiple realities. The focus on meanings in 
qualitative research also lends itself to the idea that realities are constructed by the use of 
language and the shared meanings attached to language. In keeping with the qualitative 
approach (and specifically the relativist position) that is adopted here, I wish to 
continuously explicate my own preconceptions of the research topic and invite the reader 
to consider the way in which these biases influence the findings of this study and to 
compare it to his or her own ideas on the topic as a means to evaluate the trustworthiness 
of the findings. 
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The research process 
 
In conducting a thorough literature review, it emerged that very few research endeavours 
were devoted to the adaptive outcomes and experiences of individuals with diagnostic 
labels, and this lead me to identify a need for such a study. As a means of gathering data 
for the study, the interview technique was decided upon and suitable participants had to 
be identified and selected. 
 
Selection of participants and sampling strategy 
 
As the study focuses on people who have framed their diagnostic labels in ways that 
enhance their perception of self, a purposive sampling strategy was used in this study. 
Participants were identified via professional therapists to whom I provided criteria for the 
identification of suitable participants. I relied on these colleagues to contact suitable 
participants and to obtain permission from them to be contacted by me. The criteria for 
selecting suitable participants were identified as follows:  
1) The participant must have been formally diagnosed by a health professional 
with a neurological, learning or psychiatric condition as listed in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth edition, Text 
Revision (DSM IV – TR). The important element in this criterion is that the 
participant has exhibited some behavioural difficulty in the past which was 
explained by a diagnostic label;  
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2) The participant must have accepted the diagnostic label to apply to him or her 
and must have shared this knowledge with others in his or her life;  
3) The participant must have adapted to the condition and achieved some success 
in managing the labelled behaviour, as well as the stigma associated with the 
label.  
 
Interviews of approximately one hour’s length with five participants were held to ensure 
that enough data were obtained within the limited timeframe for the study. Only three 
interviews with three participants were utilised in the analysis phase. The reason for this 
decision is twofold. Firstly, the results obtained from the three participants as presented 
were thought to yield a satisfactory account of the phenomenon under study; and 
secondly, the data obtained from the excluded interviews were deemed to be insufficient 
to serve the aim of this study.  
 
The interview process 
 
According to the proposed selection criteria for participants, individuals were identified 
and approached in a discrete fashion to ensure the preservation of their anonymity and 
integrity. Murphy and Dingwall (2003) describe the qualitative interview as “an 
opportunity to explore how informants themselves define the experiences and practices 
that are the object of the research” (p. 82). Therefore, efforts were made to avoid the 
imposition of predetermined categories, themes, etc. on research participants in a rigid 
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manner, and I was allowed the freedom to take new leads as they arose during the 
interview process.  
 
Due to time constraints and the limited scope of this particular study, I found it useful to 
compile an interview schedule with identified themes, which were of interest to me, in 
order to guide the collection of data and to avoid deviating too far from the heart of the 
topic. It is important to remember that the interview schedule served as a beacon from 
which to explore different themes that emerged during the interviews, and far from being 
a standardised questionnaire, it served to remind me of the research aims in the event that 
the conversation got too far off track. Please refer to Appendix A for the full interview 
schedule. 
 
It is important for the reader to take note that any conversation, even an interview, is 
inevitably situated in a specific social context, and whatever is communicated cannot be 
abstracted from the contextual constraints that bear on it (Murphy & Dingwall, 2003). 
The latter authors argue that participants’ communications will always be guided by their 
perceptions of what the researcher expects of them in the interview setting, and that such 
settings are invariably used by both the researcher and participants to present themselves 
as competent, reasonable individuals, whose actions are rational when explained from 
their perspectives. Such circular influences between researcher and participant are 
important aspects for the reader to consider when evaluating the credibility of the 
researcher’s interpretations. 
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However, in an attempt to minimise my directive influence, identified participants were 
presented with a general description of the aim and nature of the study. This was done in 
a manner that is non-directive; i.e. care was given not to influence the participants’ 
personal disclosures by presenting the aim in a specific direction. For example, by 
describing the aim of the study as an endeavour to explore individuals’ experiences of 
adapting to being formally diagnosed with a psychiatric condition and what they perceive 
the effects to have been on their outcomes in life relative to their diagnosis, participants 
were presumably provoked to think about their adaptive responses to their diagnostic 
labels without prescribing to them a right or wrong way of doing so.  
 
Data-analysis strategy 
 
As was discussed earlier, qualitative approaches choose to embrace the complexity of the 
settings or situations that are being studied. As the scope of a mini-thesis (in fact most 
research reports) is fairly limited, I was confronted with the task of selecting relevant data 
to the exclusion of other data to inform my interpretations, as an inclusion of everything 
is virtually impossible. This again raises the issue of researcher bias, as one might ask 
why certain data or interpretations are chosen and included above others. Based on the 
fact that the interpretations included represent my own view of the situation, which is but 
one of multiple ways to construe the data, Murphy and Dingwall’s (2003) three principles 
to consider when selecting what data to include in a representative research report were 
considered.  
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These include, firstly, that attention be given to extraordinary as well as routine or 
commonplace events; secondly, that sufficient contextual descriptions accompany the 
events that are included in order to allow for alternative interpretations; and thirdly, that 
exceptions or deviant events (i.e. those that do not fit the researcher’s proposed 
interpretations) are also included, should they manifest. By stating these principles 
explicitly, I hoped not only to remind myself to reflect on the degree to which my choices 
of what to include constitutes a representative account of the data, but also to encourage 
the reader to do the same. 
 
Discourse analysis 
 
Discourse analysis was used in this study as the method for data analysis due to its fit 
with the aim of the study. Ballinger and Cheek (2006, p. 201) mention that there is 
widespread confusion regarding “the purpose, ontology and methods” of discourse 
analysis, and argues that this stems mainly from the fact that discourse analysis is not a 
unified approach. In this regard, it is important to state explicitly that the discourse 
analysis utilised in this study draws on the postmodern ontology and seeks to describe the 
way discourses operate to construct certain views of reality to the exclusion or 
downplaying of alternative views.  
 
In describing the contribution of Michel Foucault’s thinking to the understanding of 
discourses, Ballinger and Cheek (2006) mention that “Foucault posited the intimate 
association between power and knowledge … and explored this ‘power/knowledge’ link 
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using his concept of discourse” (p. 201). Specifically, Foucault saw power as an implicit 
consequence of the social and historical organisation of societies that saw certain 
discourses become prominent at certain times. Thus, according to Ballinger and Cheek 
(2003): 
 
[D]iscursive frameworks order reality in a particular way, rendering it 
visible and understandable. At the same time, they constrain the 
production of understanding and knowledge that might offer alternative 
views of that reality (p. 202).  
 
Terre Blanche, Durrheim and Kelly (2006) make a similar observation and describe 
discourse analysis as “the act of showing how certain discourses are deployed to achieve 
particular effects in specific contexts” (p. 328). Fitting with the description of discourse 
analysis provided above, the aim was to identify and make explicit how the discourses, or 
ways of talking about each neurological, learning or psychiatric condition, leads to 
possibilities for participants to construct meaning from their experiences that serve to 
enhance positive perceptions of themselves as individuals living with a diagnostic label. 
To guide me in this quest, the following questions as formulated by Ballinger and Cheek 
(2006, p. 211) were considered: 
 
• How are particular sorts of individuals, organisations and systems  
legitimised and strengthened through the operation of certain 
discourses? 
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• How do discourses work together to sustain particular realities  
and truths? 
 
I therefore refrained from searching for truths in the transcribed texts from the 
participants’ interviews, but rather attempted to understand what happens (what reality is 
created) when they use language and discourses surrounding their diagnostic labels in a 
particular way and in a particular context.  
 
To achieve the abovementioned goal, the directions put forward in Terre Blanche et al. 
(2006) were utilised. These authors admit that “there are no hard-and-fast methods for 
identifying discourses and analysing texts” (p. 330), but provides a multi-level approach 
for analysing the discourses operating in a text through immersion in and extracting 
oneself from the text and the culture that produced it. These contrasting positions allow a 
researcher to recognise the presence of various discourses by recognising the customs and 
ways of talking in that culture through his or her immersion in it. Also, by reflecting on 
the text and culture, he or she is able to gain awareness of the workings of discourses in 
achieving certain effects. The latter position is achieved through creating a critical 
distance between researcher and text (Terre Blanche et al., 2006, p. 331).  
 
Identifying the effects of discourses 
 
Ballinger and Cheek (2006) identify texts as the basic unit of analysis within discourse 
analysis, and argue that such texts are productive in nature, in that they convey 
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information that promotes specific constructions of reality. Texts can, therefore, not be 
assumed to be neutral ways of conveying information, but have specific, intended effects 
on its audience, which are conveyed by its assumptions that it will be understood 
(Ballinger & Cheek, 2006, Sarangi, 2000). Each participant’s text was, therefore, read 
through several times, after which it was analysed for various discourses and the effects 
these achieved or failed to achieve. While reading through the texts, I drew on my 
knowledge of and membership to Westernised South African culture as well as the 
mental health community and its customary ways of conversing, while also reflecting on 
the realities such ways of conversing create.  
 
Binary oppositions, such as competent versus incompetent, normal versus crazy, were 
identified when present. Terre Blanche et al. (2006) highlight the importance of also 
attending to implicit binary oppositions, where one part of the opposition is explicitly 
stated and the other part is implied but silenced. Such silencing is illustrated when a 
psychologist says to a client that she is pleased to see that his complaining has subsided 
and that it is a sure sign that his depression is lifting. The implicit message is that his 
complaints are unpleasant and a sign of dysfunction, signalling the possible functioning 
of the ‘no news is good news’ discourse. Such binary oppositions can have the effect of 
appealing to the audience to align themselves to a particular side of the opposition 
(usually the side advocated in the text) and therefore have immense power in creating a 
particular reality and closing the possibilities for alternative realities (Terre Blanche et al., 
2006). 
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Furthermore, recurrent phrases and metaphors that are used to convey participants’ 
experiences with and perceptions and expectations of their diagnostic labels were 
attended to, as such phrases colour the meanings of events and experiences in people’s 
lives (Terre Blanche et al, 2006). Terms such as ‘disorder’, ‘disability’ or ‘mental 
condition’ frame the meaning of the text in a particular way and present the subject of the 
text (in this case the participant) as ‘victim’, ‘innocent’, ‘helpless’, ‘sick’, and so on. The 
question, “What other terms could have been used to describe this person?” was kept in 
mind throughout the analysis of the results in order to reflect on the effects of such 
‘victim’ (or any other) discourses. 
 
A third consideration that was attended to when performing the discourse analysis was 
the subjects around whom the texts centred. As mentioned before, discourses have certain 
effects or powers on the audience and this holds for the subjects of the text as well. Terre 
Blanche et al. (2006) mention that discourses interact with one another to construct the 
subjects (participants) in particular ways. Depending on the micro context of the text, i.e. 
the text as contextualised in “conversation and debate” (Terre Blanche et al., 2006, p. 
337), subjects and their actions can be construed as possessing purpose (Van Leeuwen, 
2000), i.e. as being ‘helpless’, ‘voiceless’, ‘victims of their circumstances’, or 
‘empowered victors’. Therefore, each interview was scrutinised in order to gain an 
understanding of the way in which the discourses operating in them interact to construct 
realities of empowered people with options for ‘better’ outcomes within particular 
contexts.  
 
   
     61
Attending to context 
 
As is evident from the above discussion, context plays a major role in discourse analysis. 
Terre Blanche et al. (2006) suggest that discourse analysis should place texts into a micro 
context as well as a macro context. The former refers to context as created by the 
interactive nature of conversations, where individuals open up and close certain avenues 
of conversation through their mutual responses to what the other person brought to the 
table. Thus certain possibilities (also realities) are promoted or restricted by the flow of 
the conversation (Terre Blanche et al., 2006). Similarly, Ballinger and Cheek (2006) 
describe how the tone and connotations of particular words have performative qualities in 
that such words convey messages about the implicit and expected reaction that the text 
seeks to illicit from its audience. 
 
The macro context refers to the broader setting of social practices, ideologies, norms and 
conventions within which conversations take place. The cultural practices and norms of a 
society prescribe the types of conversations that are appropriate in whichever setting 
(Terre Blanche, et al., 2006). For example, in a Westernised setting it is considered wise 
to follow the advice of doctors or psychologists when you experience physical or 
interpersonal problems, and their opinions on the possible outcomes (prognosis) of the 
problem are often taken as gospel. 
 
 Terre Blanche et al. (2006) propose that “[a] discourse seems to have a life across 
specific contexts. Thus, discourses are inflected with nuances of the particular institution 
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in which they are being used’ (p. 338). In accordance with this idea, Ballinger and Cheek 
(2006), propose that discourse analysis, by principle, also focuses on “how particular 
texts are indicative of wider cultural understanding and ways of sense making” (p. 204).  
 
Consequently, attention was also given to the different means by which discourses work 
in different institutional contexts to inform the realities of participants as adapted 
individuals. It was assumed then that participants’ experiences of their involvement in 
and interactions with different macro settings, such as family, health care settings, 
religious institutions and the like, interrelate to colour their realities as labelled 
individuals with certain outcomes. 
 
Therefore, an attempt was made to understand participants’ constructions of their 
identities in terms of the interactions of the discourses with one another in the context of 
conversations with others, as well as the meanings these discourses carry in the macro 
context of institutions and culture. 
 
 
The researcher as co-constructor 
 
The last consideration in the discourse-analysis process that was attended to involves a 
researcher’s role in co-constructing the realities of participants through his or her 
observations, descriptions and involvement with participants. According to Terre Blanche 
et al. (2006), a discourse analyst plays a crucial part in constructing the realities of 
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participants by means of the ways in which he or she punctuates their texts and analyses 
them, which also has certain effects and contexts, as this interaction between the analyst 
and the participants’ texts bring about a new text.  
 
Specifically, my wish was to explore the adaptive outcomes of participants with 
diagnostic labels, and thus analysed their texts according to this goal. This in itself had 
certain effects, as a researcher (who brings his or her own views, understandings and 
ways of relating) becomes an active participant in the construction of participants’ 
realities. 
 
Trustworthiness and credibility of the study 
 
While I have attempted, throughout my discussion of the various phases of the study, to 
promote the trustworthiness and credibility of the research through open and transparent 
self-reflection and fair representation of different views, I realise that there is no method 
to guarantee the quality of this research endeavour. Therefore, the reader is explicitly 
invited to continuously engage in the evaluative practice of my findings. In an attempt to 
promote further reflection on the trustworthiness of this research endeavour, I would like 
to offer what Ballinger (2006, p. 240) calls “considerations for evaluation” to aid in the 
evaluation of the quality of the findings. 
 
The first of these considerations involves the coherence of a study (Ballinger, 2006). 
When referring to the coherence of a study, the reader is encouraged to consider to what 
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extent there is a fit between the various aspects of a study, including the aim of a study, 
the methods used to pursue this aim, the worldview that informs a researcher’s decisions 
regarding his or her study and the extent to which a researcher acknowledges his or her 
role in producing the findings. 
 
The second consideration concerns the extent to which the reader can see evidence of 
systematic and responsible research conduct. Such evidence might be reflected in the 
degree to which a researcher has given thought to his or her impact on participants, given 
the way he or she presented himself or herself to them, as well as through the provision of 
fitting extracts that have been accurately transcribed, described and contextualised to 
clearly illustrate the researcher’s interpretations (Ballinger, 2006). 
 
The third consideration deals with the degree to which a researcher’s interpretations are 
convincing and relevant (also known as plausibility). Apart from being compelling or 
interesting, Ballinger (2006) also recognises that research should contribute to the 
knowledge or understanding of the domain under enquiry. 
 
Finally, the reader is also encouraged to consider whether a researcher has shown 
sufficient reflexivity, meaning that he or she has shown sensitivity to the role he or she 
plays in the research process and outcomes, and that this role is appropriately accounted 
for given his or her epistemological orientation (Ballinger, 2006). 
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Ethical considerations 
 
As research in the field of social science often focuses on topics that require participants 
to disclose details of their personal and lived experiences, it holds the threat that 
participants can be disadvantaged through their participation in research studies. In this 
regard, Wassenaar (2006) states that 
 
… [it could] be argued that in most social science research the burdens of 
the research are borne by the participants while the benefits accrue to the 
researcher, who gains degrees, publications, prestige, promotion, etc., 
while the circumstances of the research participants remain unchanged 
(p.68).  
 
In order to avoid such exploitation of research participants, the philosophical principles 
of autonomy and respect, non-maleficence and beneficence that guide ethical research 
(Wassenaar, 2006) were applied in this study.  
 
 
Autonomy and respect 
 
The first principle of autonomy and respect proposes that research participants have the 
right to maintain personal agency during the research process, as reflected by their 
understanding that their involvement in any study is voluntary; that they can terminate 
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their involvement at any point during the research process; that they have full knowledge 
regarding the nature and purpose of the study; and that their identity and any information 
they share can remain confidential on their request (Wassenaar, 2006).  
 
In accordance with the principle of autonomy, participants were informed verbally and in 
writing of their rights and responsibilities, should they choose to participate in the current 
study. This was formalised on an informed consent form signed by myself and each 
participant, in order to ensure that all ethical conditions have been adhered to. Please 
refer to Appendix B for a copy of the consent form.  
 
Non-maleficence  
 
Related to the principle of autonomy and respect, the second principle of non-
maleficence requires that research participants be protected from any personal harm as a 
result of their participation in a study (Wassenaar, 2006). In order to protect participants 
from any emotional or relational harm that could result from the current study, efforts 
were made to put them at ease regarding the confidentiality of the information they 
shared.  
 
In addition, given the nature of the topic, care was taken to avoid framing participants’ 
experiences in a way that could lead to them feeling debilitated or stigmatised. This was 
achieved by acknowledging and respecting participants’ strengths and capacities, rather 
than only focussing on their negative experiences. As a further precaution against 
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emotional harm, participants were provided with the contact details of a psychotherapy 
clinic, in the event that our conversations might evoke experiences that they wish to 
address with the help of a psychotherapist. 
 
Beneficence 
 
According to the principle of beneficence, researchers should make the necessary efforts 
to maximise the potential benefits to participants for their participation in a study 
(Wassenaar, 2006). The benefits that stem from research should also extend to larger 
segments of society. In order to adhere to the principle of beneficence, an attempt was 
made to provide a supportive and respectful context for participants to share their stories.  
 
In addition, as mentioned above, my interactions with participants were aimed at striking 
a balance between eliciting information on their struggles and accentuating their strengths 
and capacities. In this regard, I believe participants benefited personally from our 
collaborative effort to reframe (in a positive way) their experiences with their diagnostic 
labels as interpersonal metaphors. These benefits can also be extended to larger segments 
of society, as the research offers a way for psychotherapists to utilise individuals’ existing 
diagnostic labels in a positive, non-stigmatising way in psychotherapy. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the qualitative research design was described as a useful and appropriate 
approach for investigating the meaning-construction processes participants engage in to 
construct their identities as empowered individuals in relation to their diagnostic labels. 
The application of the qualitative techniques in relation to the sampling of suitable 
participants, as well as data gathering and analysis, was described. Specifically, discourse 
analysis was presented as the method of data analysis and its basic principles were 
explained in terms of its relevance to this study. Finally, my attempts to illustrate the 
trustworthiness and credibility of this study as well as its ethical foundations were 
clarified. With these tasks settled, the focus in Chapter 4 will turns to the presentation of 
the participants’ interview results as subjected to discursive analysis. 
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Chapter 4 – Presentation of Participants’ Interview Results 
 
Having dealt with the guiding methods of the research endeavour, this chapter is 
dedicated to the analysis of the personal accounts of the individuals that participated in 
this study. I trust that it will be evident from the outset that I consider myself to be an 
active participant in the construction of the narrative realities that follow. Accordingly, 
my inquiries should be seen as invitations to participants to engage in the activity of 
defining their identities in various domains of functioning in general, and in terms of their 
respective diagnoses in particular. This implies my acceptance of the fluidity of 
participants’ identities in relation to whomever they converse with and which activity 
type they are performing.  
 
Therefore, in my capacity as participant-researcher, I acknowledge that I have 
contributed to the definition of the discussions as interviews, which in turn enabled and 
constricted various possibilities of communicative performance. In light of this, I 
subjected my enquiries along with the responses of participants to the discursive analysis, 
and explicitly stated the activity type that is requested or performed, if it was indicated. 
The excerpts of interview data are often presented in a dialogical form with two or more 
speaker turns. This is done to illustrate the interactive and collaborative nature of the 
meaning-construction process between participants and myself. To facilitate cross- 
referencing to dialogical turns, each speaker turn have been numbered, and reference to a 
specific dialogical turn is indicated in the text as either “Turn 1”, “Turn 2”, etc. 
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Furthermore, the results are presented in the form of metaphoric narratives with different 
unfolding plots. This approach was opted for as it will hopefully inform the reader on 
how I thought about and made sense of participants’ stories. This should also draw 
attention to the subjective nature of my interpretations. I believe that metaphors provide 
rich reference points for making sense of abstract lived experiences, while avoiding the 
traps of objectifying such experiences as absolutes. The reader is therefore invited to 
consider alternative metaphoric narratives and plots, and the way in which this could 
impact on the interpretations offered. 
 
Parkinson’s: When there are three sides to a coin 
 
Tiaan,
2
 an Afrikaans-speaking white man, is a distinguished academic who at the age of 
52 years has completed numerous degrees in various academic fields, and continues to 
expand on his already impressive scholarly achievements by applying himself to the field 
of psychology at present. In his own words, Tiaan describes himself as “a scholar of life” 
and this is evident in his definitions of life’s experiences and difficulties, and how he 
situates himself in them.  
 
Tiaan was married for 24 years and has two children, both in their early adulthood. In 
December 2005 Tiaan was on holiday with his wife, and while out on a stroll along the 
beach, he noticed that his left foot’s sandal was dragging on the tar road. A while later he 
consulted his general practitioner, who referred him to a neurologist, and he was 
diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease. Tiaan describes his journey of coming to terms with 
                                                 
2
 A pseudonym is used to protect the participant’s anonymity. 
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this news as a personal one, where his life as he knew it came to a grinding halt. Apart 
from the challenges to his perception of self, the diagnostic event also placed strain on his 
intimate relationships, as Tiaan and his wife subsequently divorced. Also, his 
relationships with his children changed, and he sees them less frequently than before his 
diagnosis.  
 
Tiaan’s story of what followed is one of struggle and heartbreak, yet shimmers with 
courage and hope for new possibilities in his life. I now offer my account of his story by 
unpacking the discourses that we both contributed to the construction of his identity as a 
person living with Parkinson’s disease.  
 
When disaster struck 
 
It is said that the more something is coveted, the greater the experience of loss is when 
the object of one’s affection ceases to be. When we assume that our physical appearance 
and functioning comprise an integral part of our identities and how we relate to the world 
around us (Barlow & Durand, 2005), it follows that news of a disturbance in our agency 
to conduct our physical selves in our environments holds a threat to our identities. 
Following the diagnostic event where he appropriated the Parkinson’s label, Tiaan 
describes the impact this event had on him: 
 
1) Researcher: And then, at this stage, the diagnosis that you, well, are 
diagnosed with? 
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2) Tiaan: Three years and a bit ago, I was diagnosed with Parkinson’s 
disease. Yes, we can talk a bit about it later on, but it was a bit of a 
shock because it is a physical thing. I had always been a physical 
person, and sport activities and working in the garden, and my body is 
very important to me. I looked after my body through all the years, I 
never played contact sports and ruined my body, I always exercised 
and took care of my body. So it was a big shock to hear that I have a 
degenerative illness, and uhm, I feel it in my body every day, that there 
is something that gnaws at it, that there is something which is not 
right. 
 
Firstly, it should be noted that the dialogue takes the form of an inquiry or interrogation, 
i.e. the interaction is defined as one where I request information and Tiaan provides 
information according to his discretion and to the best of his ability. The first of my 
questions in this excerpt contains certain assumptions, the most important of which 
pertains to agency.  
 
By framing my question in the passive voice, Tiaan is presented to have been a passive 
agent, or even the object of the actions of another unknown agent. Tiaan’s response to 
this question follows suit and he also frames himself as a passive recipient of the 
diagnostic label. This has the effect of defining Tiaan as having lacked personal agency at 
the time of the diagnosis, and thus the diagnosis is presented as an infliction, something 
that happened to him over which he had no control. This definition of him as lacking 
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control over what happened to him is further strengthened by the shock he experienced 
after the event. In essence, Tiaan attributes his shock to the fact that he himself took 
several preventive measures, albeit unknowingly, over the years, but yet this did not 
enable him to avoid Parkinson’s disease.  
 
The effect created by this preventive discourse is that it resolves Tiaan of any blame or 
responsibility for this infliction, while also painting Parkinson’s as an invincible force, 
something that could not be prevented. Consequently, the impact and intensity of the 
disturbing news is escalated, thereby inflating the challenges and struggles he has yet to 
talk about.  
 
In the context of the bigger discussion (i.e. one defined as a research interview centring 
on individuals’ adaptation to diagnostic labels), the implicit request made to Tiaan is to 
engage in an activity of defining himself in terms of how he adapted to a presumably 
negative event. Therefore, the request demands that he relate his identity and adjustment 
to the negative diagnostic event. The positive-negative binary opposition thus operates to 
inflate the struggles and challenges, in order to inflate the impressiveness of his 
adjustments to his struggles. 
 
It is also interesting to note how the illness itself is presented. Tiaan first defines 
Parkinson’s as “a physical thing”, thereby adding specificity and vagueness in terms of 
the locus of responsibility to the definition at the same time. Two lines later, he defines 
Parkinson’s as a “degenerative illness”, which is more specific in terms of the 
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consequences that it entails, but now lacks specificity in terms of what is affected. The 
first definition of Parkinson’s as a “physical thing” is used to highlight his positive 
attributes in the past, i.e. being active, by relating it to the physical side of Parkinson’s. 
The second definition as a “degenerative illness” highlights the continuation of his battle 
with Parkinson’s, which is represented as a parasitic agent that nibbles at his body and 
causes continual decline in physical functioning. The third definition that he offers, 
frames Parkinson’s as a “neurological thing”, something that is in the brain.  
 
Specifically, Tiaan later expresses his disbelief that the physical symptoms represented a 
neurological disease: “…but I never thought that it was a neurological thing…”. These 
various definitions of Parkinson’s create the effect of a gradual escalation of the 
seriousness of his condition. Notice also that there is a decline in the degree of personal 
responsibility associated with each definition. The first definition, Parkinson’s as a 
“physical thing” could entail that responsibility for the effects of the condition resides 
with him. Parkinson’s as a “degenerative illness” implies that the condition is an 
infliction, whereas Parkinson’s as a “neurological thing” implies that all the symptoms 
and the origin of the condition are due to the complex neurological system, which is 
presented to be an agent distinct from Tiaan. 
 
The preventive discourse then draws on cultural values of personal control, and opposing 
this discourse with the fact that he developed Parkinson’s disease, Tiaan is presented as 
someone who complied with the values of personal control. His developing Parkinson’s, 
on the other hand, is presented as a fatalistic event, one that could not be prevented. The 
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fate of his situation maximises the adversity which he is faced with, and lays the ground 
for a construction of himself as one who faces this impossible situation head-on. In effect, 
Tiaan’s situation demands a difficult choice to make … to either adapt or die. 
 
What the idea of adapt or die advocates is the necessity of organisms, including humans, 
to adjust their relative positions in their ever-changing environments in order to avoid 
catastrophe. In the preceding sentence, “relative positions” can refer to various levels of 
functioning, including our physical, mental, relational and emotional responses to 
changes in the environment. In the following dialogue, Tiaan describes his response to 
the first indications that something was up, as well as his struggles with what it will hold 
for him in the future: 
 
1) Researcher: … so I’m just wondering in terms of when you saw your 
foot dragging, what came up for you in terms of what it might entail 
for you? 
2) Tiaan: I didn’t really grasp it at that stage, because, but I think a 
diagnosis, if one gives a name to a condition and you name a thing, 
then the condition gets personified, it gets internalised. At that stage I 
thought it was just fatigue, maybe a physical fatigue, it’s year-end, 
December month, on holiday, and now I’m walking strange, a bit off 
balance. Uhm, I really didn’t want to think about it. Like I said, only 
ten months later did I have the courage to do something about it. 
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In this excerpt of our discussion, the initial question frames the presenting symptom, i.e. 
his foot that was dragging, as potentially holding significant implications for his future 
outcomes. Implicit in this framing of the question is the assumption that the symptom 
acted as a sign of things to come, and that these are significant things in terms of how he 
defined himself in relation to the symptom. In effect, my enquiry can be seen as 
requesting a definition of self in terms of future outcomes. 
 
Tiaan’s response to my invitation indicates that the significance of what he was about to 
face eluded him initially, and that the significance of the symptom as a sign only became 
a reality to him after it was given a name. His initial denial of the importance of the 
symptom as a signal and his rationalisation of what it might be points to the multitude of 
possibilities that are available before the symptom was framed as Parkinson’s disease. 
Effectively, the benign nature of the interpretation of the symptom as merely fatigue is 
contrasted with the seriousness of the official interpretation of it as Parkinson’s and the 
narrowing of possibilities, which brings into salience the intensity of the blow he 
eventually was dealt. The struggle and courage that he had to showcase is further 
emphasised by his admission of the time he needed to prepare himself for the revelation 
of the ‘truth’. In effect, the revelation of the ‘truth’ of his situation is framed as an ordeal 
that required excessive preparation and courage to adjust to.  
 
I proceeded to ask Tiaan to clarify his definitions of the concepts “personify” and 
“internalise” as used in the preceding excerpt: 
 
   
     77
1) Researcher: What do you mean when you say personify and 
internalise? 
2) Tiaan: I think the moment one is diagnosed with an illness, you must 
do something with the label that is given to you … Then you start 
reading about it and then begin looking at the symptoms, and then all 
of a sudden you start seeing symptoms that are described in the 
literature. So my biggest struggle in the beginning was, “Am I the 
illness, or is the illness in me? What is the relationship between me 
and the diagnosis?” I think the internalising or the personifying 
thereof comes as a first shock: “I am Parkinson’s, I am cancer, I am 
diabetes”. And to get over that thing, I think it is one of the biggest 
steps one should make, and that comes with time, it comes through 
reflection, it comes through knowledge acquisition. My first reaction 
was: “Oh, I’ll outlive this thing, I shall carry on with my movements, 
my activities”. I still went horse riding, drove my motorcycle … and 
all of a sudden these things started taking their toll. 
 
Here Tiaan describes a process of adaptation that he frames as an imperative, indicated 
by the framing “… must do something …”. Furthermore, this process is described as 
something that applies to all individuals, which presents Tiaan as an authority figure on 
the steps needed to make this transition, based on his personal experience with this 
process. He then explicitly defines his “biggest struggle” in terms of differentiating and 
possibly integrating his identity and the Parkinson’s condition. Already, he defines 
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himself as having made significant progress in this regard, as he frames this struggle as 
an initial one, i.e. “in the beginning”. 
 
It is interesting to note the implications of the adapt or die discourse, as it presents 
different and seemingly contradictory levels of logic. Firstly it implies that a choice needs 
to be made, but it also imposes a necessity to adapt, as one cannot exist without having 
adapted. Tiaan seems to utilise these levels of logic in legitimising his choice of not 
fighting his condition at present, as in the past he was subjected to this necessary process 
of adaptation. In other words, he went through the motions of challenging the disorder 
and carrying on living through his fighting spirit, etc., which is framed as something that 
is a natural response to such a condition.  
 
However, Tiaan states the following: 
 
So I wanted to challenge the diagnosis, but it became too much. Then I 
needed to enter a different phase of my understanding of the situation, 
meaning that it would require a new lifestyle from me. 
 
His realisation that he needed to adapt or die then demanded a more difficult challenge 
from him, one that required a difficult choice. This choice was to sacrifice his old 
lifestyle, which he experienced as very fulfilling, and settle into a new one that fits with 
his condition. Although this choice was demanded from him by his condition, he was the 
one who entered a different phase of his “understanding of the situation”, which allows 
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Tiaan to claim and incorporate the culturally valued characteristics such as maturity and 
perseverance into his definition of self.  
 
The two sides of a coin: The false dilemma 
 
After his confrontation with the official interpretation of his physical difficulties as being 
indicative of Parkinson’s, Tiaan’s efforts to integrate this new information into his 
definition of self in relation to his environment presented him with various images of the 
effects and possibilities associated with Parkinson’s disease. Given his age at which he 
was diagnosed and the stereotypes associated with the condition, Tiaan describes the 
dissonance that he was faced with in integrating his impressions of Parkinson’s into his 
definition of his future self: 
 
They [the neurologists] both emphasised that I am still very young for this 
condition, which naturally was a big shock for me, because it is basically 
an old person’s illness of walking slow, walking with a crooked back, 
being slightly off balance, slow to stand up out of your chair, and to 
visualise such a picture for myself was very traumatic for me, that I can 
now become like an old person after a life of activity, and outdoors, and 
walking, and camping, and being busy. 
 
Here Tiaan describes one of the available images that significantly restricts the 
possibilities to adversely negative implications of having Parkinson’s. In a culture that 
   
     80
places high value on youth and physical vitality, the notion of aging has become imbued 
with negative connotations. Although there are also some culturally valued aspects, such 
as wisdom and maturity, that are associated with old age, Tiaan does not include this in 
his visualisation of himself as becoming like “an old person”. The contrast of his 
relatively young age against the drastic representation of an old person’s illness 
juxtaposes the stereotyped image of Parkinson’s with his personal image of self. 
Effectively, the idea emerges that he is somehow different from the stereotypical image, 
and that this would call for a different or altered image of the condition as it pertains to 
him.  
 
Tiaan expands on his need for a unique image of his situation in response to my enquiry 
about his previous encounters with images of Parkinson’s: 
 
1) Researcher: Did you have any previous ideas about … or have you 
heard from Parkinson’s before you …? 
2) Tiaan: My knowledge of Parkinson’s was an old man in our church … 
and he shivered terribly, his head shivered terribly, and his hands 
shivered, so it was the only image I had of Parkinson’s. I also heard of 
Michael J. Fox, there lay a book of his next to you, who also has the 
condition under wraps. Uhm, from the beginning I was scared to read 
about the condition. I took out articles from the library, but after 
having paged through it, I saw that it wasn’t written for me, it was 
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written for people in an old age home, people who can’t chew their 
food properly, who mess on their chests, and I said this is not me … 
  
Here it is clear that Tiaan’s emphatic rejection of the stereotyped image of people with 
Parkinson’s and his refusal to associate himself with such images serve to highlight his 
differences in relation to the typical case. By exclaiming his individuality and uniqueness 
as a relatively young person with Parkinson’s, Tiaan attributes qualities to his identity 
that set him apart from the typical case, and in effect the possibility emerges that he 
might have a fighting chance to obtain different outcomes. Later in our discussion, Tiaan 
explicitly acknowledges his faith in his own distinctive chances:  
 
… what I held onto is that it is a unique situation, and that I look different 
from an old man in an old age home that messes on his chest because he 
can’t keep his food in his mouth. 
 
He also expresses his need to form his unique image of his condition in response to other 
people’s tellings about Parkinson’s: 
 
So I got differing images of the illness, people who died as a result, people 
who became passive, became totally immobile as a result, and then other 
people who just carried on with their lives … Yes differing images came 
up for me, from somewhere I had to create my own image of this thing. 
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An important distinction between the hopeful and negative images of Parkinson’s that 
Tiaan describes is the amount of detail he utilises in the respective descriptions. When 
describing the negative images he is faced with, Tiaan employs highly specific and 
visually descriptive words with the effect of presenting an absolute and narrow definition 
of Parkinson’s. However, because he does not fit the mould of these negative images, the 
absolute and narrow outcomes need not apply to him. Instead he chooses to buy into 
more hopeful images of the condition, which he does not describe in any specificity and 
does not imbue with absolute terms. As a result, these hopeful images allow for more 
flexible outcomes and possibilities for his future. 
 
Head in the ground 
 
In evolutionary discourse it is advocated that organisms, when confronted with an 
extreme and threatening situation, have essentially two options, either to fight or to flee. 
(Geen, 1995) However, even though individuals often buy into such dichotomies, it 
usually appears after some closer inspection that such dilemmas invariably contain 
certain falsehoods.  
 
Being confronted with a severely threatening revelation pertaining to his definition of 
self, Tiaan describes a similar behavioural dilemma he was faced with and the way in 
which it influenced his initial attitude towards his condition: 
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1) Researcher: How did he [the neurologist] explain it to you, when he 
told you it is Parkinson’s? What was his explanation about what you 
can expect and what Parkinson’s is, and that type of thing? 
2) Tiaan: I can’t really remember Nico, whether he gave me a terrible 
lecture about the situation, I was, I was in such a trans, I was so 
anxious, I was totally freaked out that I can’t remember … 
 
He continues after discussing the images of Parkinson’s he found from articles in the 
library: 
 
3) Tiaan: Yes, and then also a piece, a piece of denial of the situation, 
and what I held on to is that it is a unique situation, and that I look 
different from an old man in an old age home … I didn’t see myself in 
that picture. I decided that I am going to give this thing a go, I am 
going to fight it … 
 
In Turn 1 in the preceding excerpt, I ask Tiaan to reflect on the information he was given 
by the expert on Parkinson’s regarding the implications of being diagnosed with 
Parkinson’s. Implicitly, I define the expert as a knowledge bearer on the condition, whose 
responsibility it was to impart information on the receiver, Tiaan. The framing of my 
question, however, does not imply a unidirectional flow of information with Tiaan as a 
passive receiver of knowledge.  
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Rather, in framing my question as “What was his explanation …?” the emerging 
definition of the interaction becomes a complementary one, where the expert’s 
responsibility is to impart his subjective explanation and Tiaan has the responsibility to 
do something with the information he receives. This definition of their interaction is not 
explicitly stated in my question, but is inferred from the context of their interaction, i.e. 
an interaction that includes an expert who informs; a topic (Parkinson’s) that is discussed; 
Tiaan who is being informed on the topic; and a culturally negotiated agreement on the 
script of such a type of interaction. Tiaan’s response to this question then relies on the 
coherence of my text. 
 
In his response, i.e. Turn 2, Tiaan accepts and responds to my definition of his interaction 
with the neurologist by confirming the expert’s role as ‘lecturer’, yet legitimises his 
rejection of his own role as information recipient in the interaction. He achieves this 
legitimation by highlighting the stressful nature of the situation and describing his 
reaction as one of being in a “trans”. It can thus be argued that he draws on the flight 
contingency of the fight or flight discourse to explain his reaction to the devastating news 
he received. In effect, in a culture where taking a fighting stance is valued, the context 
that is being constructed by Tiaan allows his audience, including me, to develop 
sympathy for his situation and his flight reaction. 
 
His flight reaction is carried over to his elaboration on his emerging attitude in Turn 3, 
albeit in a modified form. His explicit acknowledgement of his denial of the situation 
strengthens the sympathetic effect on his audience, as it communicates self-awareness of 
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his reactions. Furthermore, in his explicit acknowledgement of his denial, Tiaan achieves 
a remarkable transformation of the flight contingency into a narrative of survival and 
holding on. Although it would have been easier to give up and cower away, Tiaan states 
that he found something that could be “held on to”, and his individuality became a source 
of strength to stand up against being a victim of his diagnosis. His vivid description of an 
old man in an old age home creates a pitiful mood in the audience for such a helpless 
person, and by highlighting his own difference, Tiaan implies his refusal to be another 
victim. His initial reaction of fleeing is therefore transformed into a conscious decision to 
challenge the supposed fate that awaits him. 
 
While those who make pledges are admired for bravery, those who stick blindly to them 
are fools for pride and engineers of their own ridicule. The truth of this statement is 
besides the point, but in it I recognise a struggle that I seem to share with Tiaan and 
possibly many others. Where does one draw the line between committing to an oath and 
following it to your grave? Tiaan’s story makes reference to this question when he tells of 
his revolt against becoming a victim of the fateful implications of Parkinson’s: 
 
… There was a time in the recent past that I faked, faked walking up 
straight, faked being my old self, acting like I’m still what I was, walking 
nice and strong, but I can’t fake it anymore, and I’m making peace with it 
now, this is now a new phase that I’m entering. So if I’m a bit unsteady 
when I quickly have to turn around … or if I have to walk with a walking 
   
     86
stick … then I do it. This is how I am, and this is my image, my locus of 
control is still inside me. 
 
Here Tiaan offers an account of a phase of revolt or resistance against the physical 
implications of Parkinson’s. His repetitive use of the word “fake” in reference to his way 
of walking and being indicates the profound impact his physical symptoms had on his 
identity, so much so that he felt he needed to pretend to be what he always saw himself to 
be. Although it is not explicitly stated, there is a strong interpersonal aspect to his faking, 
as the word “acting” implies a performance to an audience. In another part of the 
discussion, Tiaan makes explicit mention of this interpersonal aspect when he says:  
 
… and I wondered what do they see in me … and then one tries to 
overcompensate for it, walk more up straight, appear more robust, and 
when you speak to people, not to put up a sorrowful voice. 
 
Tiaan’s reference to his trying to portray the image of someone walking “nice and strong” 
immediately evokes the opposing image of someone who walks with a weak posture. For 
me this binary opposition then refers to his attempts to avoid inducing pity in others, 
because in a Western culture pity is invariably reserved for the weak and victimised and 
being at the receiving end of it does not bode well for one’s perception of self. In this 
sense, his attempts at faking his old self can be seen as a revolt against assuming the 
victim role and its implications of helplessness and lack of personal agency. 
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As Tiaan acknowledges, however, his situation was such that he could not keep up with 
the faking any longer. When considering the dilemma he found himself in, i.e. the fight 
or flight contingency, it would seem that his inability to fight through faking implies a 
necessity for falling back into the victim role. It seems, however, that the fight or flight 
discourse and the rebel-victim dilemma it presents enable Tiaan to forge a middle road, a 
possibility that was ‘hidden’ from plain sight as a dilemma does not allow for its 
existence.  
 
A third side to the coin: An act of balance 
 
As is often the case, dilemmas tend to represent oversimplified accounts of situations and 
eventually turn out to be false. For a moment I return to the same excerpt discussed 
above: 
 
… There was a time in the recent past that I faked, faked walking up 
straight, faked being my old self, acting like I’m still what I was, walking 
nice and strong, but I can’t fake it anymore, and I’m making peace with it 
now, this is now a new phase that I’m entering. So if I’m a bit unsteady 
when I quickly have to turn around … or if I have to walk with a walking 
stick … then I do it. This is how I am, and this is my image, my locus of 
control is still inside me. 
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Tiaan’s acknowledgement that he “can’t fake it anymore” seemingly presents a state of 
affairs where he has given up fighting his condition. Taking a closer look at the way he 
frames his giving up control, to me it does not imply that it was imposed through defeat, 
but rather represents an acceptance of his situation. This acceptance is indicated by his 
statement: “I’m making peace with it now … if I have to walk with a walking stick … 
then I do it”.  The structure of the sentence above places Tiaan at the subject level 
performing an activity (i.e. making peace), and he is portrayed as being successful in his 
endeavour. Although his choice to make peace is indicated as a necessity, he still retains 
control over the decision, as he is in the subject position “then I do it”. The framing of the 
text in this passage effectively presents Tiaan as an active agent who arrives at a 
satisfactory state of affairs through a conscious choice for which he takes responsibility. 
 
This middle ground discourse is elaborated on by Tiaan as he describes how handing over 
control relates to his self-esteem and identity: 
 
1) Tiaan: It is not an easy process, because I mowed the lawn all these 
years and was very physical … But I think that is why it’s easier for 
older people to have Parkinson’s, because they can’t do anything 
physical anymore, so the Parkinson’s does not contribute to their self-
perception, nor to their understanding of self, it is just the aging. But I 
am not at that age yet, so it took a certain process to come to a point 
where I hand over, hand over control. 
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Further on in the dialogue: 
 
2) Researcher: … How did you draw the line between having to rely on 
people versus that you become totally helpless almost, understand, 
that you still retain that sense of control? 
3) Tiaan: The handing over of control is an important theme in this 
experience of mine … I don’t mind anymore that I can’t mow the lawn. 
I hand over the control to someone who is able to do it … But on the 
other hand I must tell you, it’s not a total abdication, because total 
abdication and total forsaking of your responsibilities would make a 
person helpless. I still have a responsibility towards myself … I only 
do it in another way, I only do it within the restrictions, within the 
parameters that are set for me now. Helpless, no, total control, also 
not, it’s something in between. 
 
Notice in Turn 1 above how Tiaan frames his struggle to wed the stereotypes associated 
with his Parkinson’s diagnosis into a harmonious perception of self. Once again he draws 
on the metaphor of aging and the stereotyped image of Parkinson’s as a condition for 
“older people” to highlight the dissonance that exists in his conception of self. The 
juncture between the implications of being old and that of having Parkinson’s is utilised 
and juxtaposed against his relatively young age in order to illustrate the unnatural 
sacrifice he has to make. In essence, he demonstrates the dilemma he faces: He cannot 
continue with his life as he did in the past, but has not reached old age yet, and so simply 
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giving in to the implications of Parkinson’s becomes a troublesome factor for his self-
esteem. Being caught between a rock and a hard place then serves to implicitly legitimise 
his handing over control, as it resulted from a necessary process due to his difficult 
position. Therefore, Tiaan can distance himself from any notions that his handing over 
control is motivated by learned helplessness or his seeking secondary gain. 
 
In Turn 2 above, my enquiry makes explicit the potential interpretations of handing over 
control as that of choosing to be helpless versus that of accepting one’s reliance on 
others. My framing of the question implies that I assume that he has drawn such a line, 
and also that I accept drawing that line and choosing reliance above helplessness as a 
preferred alternative. In this sense, I invite Tiaan to share his modus operandi in drawing 
this line, yet should he not have achieved this preferred goal, my question with all its 
assumptions would make it hard for him to admit it. It should be noted, though, that my 
enquiry did not emanate out of a vacuum, but resulted from the mutual process of making 
meaning out of our discussion thus far. Therefore, my question can be seen as another 
step in the continual process of negotiating the meanings of Tiaan’s experiences. 
 
It is seen in Turn 3 above that Tiaan accepts my invitation to explicitly define his position 
in the dichotomy I presented him with. Tiaan’s admission that he does not mind anymore 
about giving up control indicates that the argument contained in the control dichotomy is 
no longer relevant, at least to him. In other words, the message that he communicates is 
that he has reached a meta-level of understanding his situation, which transcends the 
question of retaining or losing control.  
   
     91
In deciding to accept his situation and hand over the control he forged through his faking, 
Tiaan retains control on a meta-level through a process known as dramaturgical 
legitimation, which is based on the honesty and sincerity of the speaker’s actions. In this 
sense, the dilemma of retaining or losing control clears up and he no longer stands at a 
fork in the road, forced to choose between being either rebel or victim. By transcending 
the control dilemma, a new option became available, one of choosing to accept his 
condition and hand over control. By drawing on this middle-ground discourse, he retains 
his personal agency, thereby retaining control, as one needs some control to hand over 
control. Thus Tiaan rightly states: “… my locus of control is still inside me”. 
 
Then and now: Taking stock 
 
When engaging in reflections on one’s past, it often happens that one realises in 
retrospect that things just seemed to work out for the best. Whether one chooses to call it 
fate or coincidence, what is really intriguing about such epiphanies are the meanings and 
the sense of connectedness to something greater than oneself that these realisations can 
provide. In essence, I would offer that fate explanations or discourses serve as 
reassurances that our experiences are somehow linked together and build on each other as 
fragments of a purposeful life. 
 
In a similar trend, Tiaan’s reflections on his life prior to and after his diagnosis with 
Parkinson’s lend a similar functionality to his experiences with his condition: 
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1) Researcher: With this diagnosis, you know there are all these negative 
connotations attached to it and the impact it can have on your life and 
future. Would you say that you discovered any new qualities of 
yourself … as a result of this diagnosis ...? 
2) Tiaan: Two things occur to me. Firstly, through the years and through 
mercy I have built and maintained good relationships with people. So 
when I needed them, every one of them was there, hundreds of them. 
Colleagues, family, friends, in-laws, neighbours, friends of my 
children, so my support group was in place … The other aspect that I 
discovered in myself is that my life up to now was so disciplined, 
physically and psychologically, intellectually and cognitively, so 
disciplined that I can now fall back on that sort of discipline … Every 
marathon that I ran, every hiking trail that I walked, prepared me for 
what I now […], for the qualities and attributes that I need now in 
order to go forward. Pushing through, I know about pushing through. 
 
In Turn 1 above I utilise the negative side of a binary opposition pertaining to the 
outcomes of Parkinson’s to assume the potential existence of positive outcomes that 
might have resulted as a function of the way in which Tiaan frames his experiences with 
Parkinson’s in defining his identity. In effect, Tiaan is invited to consider the possibility 
of such positive spin-offs in terms of the way in which he thinks about himself. Since our 
discussion is a reflective one, the reality of such positive spin-offs does not exist in the 
events themselves, but is created post facto, through the activity of reflecting. 
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Tiaan’s response in Turn 2 utilises reference points in the past and connects them to 
situations in the present. In this sense an arch of meaning is formed that connects events 
and experiences from his past in a purposeful way to his experiences and needs in the 
present. Tiaan achieves this creation of purpose by utilising attributive words or purpose 
links, thereby connecting certain purposeful actions to the purpose itself.  
 
For instance, consider the statement: “Every marathon that I ran … prepared me for what 
I now […], for the qualities and attributes that I need now in order to go forward”. The 
purposeful action would be “Every marathon that I ran”, whereas the purpose would be 
“prepar[ing] me … to go forward”; and the purpose link which ties the past and present 
together is “in order to”. Therefore Tiaan draws on the fate discourse to frame his 
disciplined nature in the past as having a preparatory function for his present dealings 
with Parkinson’s.  
 
It should further be noted that in this preparatory framing of purpose, Tiaan becomes the 
sole agent in which the purposeful action and the purpose itself resides, thereby situating 
power and personal agency fully inside himself. Therefore, Tiaan is framed as the agent 
who (unknowingly) engaged in the purposeful action in the past, and in doing so has 
allowed the purpose (i.e. preparing himself to move forward) to be achieved at present. 
 
This notion of purpose seems to reverberate through many of Tiaan’s accounts of the 
positive lessons he has learned through his struggles with Parkinson’s: 
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The positive thing I take from it is the […], luckily I read the book of 
Eckhard Toll, “The Power of Now”. You learn to live in the present … 
The power of now, to live now, and the quality of life definitely increases 
when one is here, and not there or in the past … 
 
And again in his account of how he benefited spiritually from his experience with 
Parkinson’s: 
 
… uhm, a closer contact with the spirit world, call it God, call it anything, 
a connectedness to all sides, horizontally, vertically, laterally. A bigger 
connectedness, I feel more human than in the old days when I used to 
chase after, I don’t know what. I feel more whole, I feel more fulfilled, I 
feel more rooted, but not without people. 
 
It seems clear from these accounts that Tiaan ascribes definite purpose and meaning to 
his struggles with Parkinson’s. Whether these purposes are determined by fate or 
constructed as stories after the fact seems unimportant. What seems to be clear is that the 
fate discourse provides him with a sense that his struggles were not without purpose. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By drawing on the various discourses described above, Tiaan is able to find meaning in 
the devastating condition he is faced with. Specifically, he refrains from buying into any 
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rigid conceptions of Parkinson’s, thereby individuating himself from the ‘typical case’ 
and constructing himself as a person with options to pave his unique way forward. In this 
sense, he embraces the responsibility to lead a purposeful and fulfilling life with the 
circumstances he has been handed.  
 
Although Tiaan’s story is largely focussed on his personal struggles with adapting to his 
diagnostic label and constructing meaning out of these struggles, he seems to rely heavily 
on an interpersonal framing of his diagnostic label to achieve this. This is seen in his 
juxtaposition of himself as a person with Parkinson’s versus the ‘typical case’ as reflected 
in the images he offers of elderly people in an old age home.  
 
Such an interpersonal framing also finds expression in his struggle to maintain his 
independence versus having to rely on the help of significant others. In this sense then, 
his diagnostic label was framed as an interpersonal metaphor for his need to find a 
midway between total independence from others versus helplessness. In this sense, Tiaan 
was able to construct a new role definition for himself in relation to others, one where he 
is a delegator of responsibilities and still maintains control and responsibility for his 
reliance on others.  
 
Now that Tiaan’s story has been subjected to a thorough analysis and discussed in detail, 
it is an appropriate point to introduce Stefan, the next participant, who has been on a 
lifelong journey with his dyslexia label. 
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Dyslexia: To bring about a revolution 
 
Stefan,
3
 an Afrikaans-speaking, white man, is currently 41 years old and works in the 
field of mechanical engineering. In 1995 he graduated with a BTech degree in 
Mechanical Engineering at a local university of technology and has achieved remarkable 
success in his career. He recently started working for a new company to broaden his 
horizons. Stefan, who describes himself as a thinker and a workaholic, reports facing big 
challenges in his occupational settings due to his difficulties with reading and writing. It 
was early in primary school when his parents sent him for a psychometric evaluation due 
to his difficulties with spelling, and during his school career he appropriated the diagnosis 
of dyslexia. 
 
Stefan reports that he has been happily married for 18 years now and that he has two 
daughters in primary school and a son of three years old. Stefan admits that he was not 
always intensely involved with his children, but when his son was born with Down’s 
syndrome, he claims to have had a change of heart and made his family his first priority. 
 
His story is one of an immense and lifelong struggle for liberation and freedom from the 
shackles imposed by the bourgeois ideals of the academic and professional systems that, 
according to him, still exist to some extent today. I have therefore come to think of Stefan 
as a revolutionary, a freethinker and a hero of change. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 A pseudonym is used to protect the participant’s anonymity. 
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Equality, privilege and injustice 
 
It is generally accepted in Western cultures that difficult times call for a hero to stand up 
tall and straight and bravely face the perils of injustice that leave others trembling. Few 
heroes of revolution have claimed their glorious titles without the aid of a context reeking 
of bitter political, economic or personal struggle. Real-life and fictional figures such as 
Nelson Mandela, Tokyo Sexwale and Batman are cases in point. In the case of Stefan, the 
injustice discourse seems to play a fundamental role in creating a context in which his 
liberation from these personal and interpersonal struggles, which are attributed to 
dyslexia, can be highlighted. Stefan, being the agent who is confronted with these 
injustices, is presented as an individual who has to battle against various obstacles in his 
fight for deliverance from the stigma associated with dyslexia. An example of the 
injustice discourse and its relation to the equality and privilege discourses is put forward 
in the following extract: 
 
1) Researcher: So at which stage of your life did you become aware of 
that label, the dyslexia, that you have it? 
2) Stefan: Man, it started already in Standard 1 dreadfully, where I stood 
in the stupid crowd and I knew clear and well that Friday the spelling 
test is done and it is darkness for me, I don’t know how I’m going to 
pass. Then you still get a hiding if you failed, know so it was just 
totally negative for me, the whole thing … Standard 3 I suddenly had 
to attend extra reading lessons during break time, where the English 
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teacher got her teacher’s pets and I now have to sit with them and 
read, because my reading ability was, and it was terribly destructive 
for me, know a fellow pupil as old as me now has to teach me how to 
read … or I have to read in front of them … that was teachers, but she 
was old, she came from the old school and the old method. So I can’t 
blame her, I mean it’s just how they saw things back then. But I can 
tell you straight now, it’s the biggest mistake that you can make, or at 
least for me it was totally wrong. And it already gave me a label, I had 
the spelling label already, then I realised I have to get the reading 
label against me as well …  
 
Here Stefan’s doubt in his own academic abilities, coupled with the negative labels others 
attached to him, is presented as a core difficulty that adversely affected his self-esteem 
and perception of self. Notice that my question in Turn 1 is a request for him to provide a 
punctuated moment in history when he became aware specifically of the dyslexia label 
and its bearing on him. Through my question I define our discursive interaction as an 
informative one, i.e. where Stefan is expected to provide historical-factual information 
regarding the time at which his ‘discovery’ of the dyslexia label occurred.  
 
Stefan’s response in Turn 2 does not provide the requested information, but instead he 
gives a reflective response on his negative experiences as a child. In framing his response 
as a reflective one, Stefan refrains from providing factual data, but rather focuses on the 
interpersonal interactions that impacted on his perception of self. Being suddenly pushed 
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into extra reading lessons evokes the image that Stefan was ill-informed and therefore ill-
prepared for the situation he was about to face at school and he is therefore presented as 
having been at the mercy of an unknown oppressive power with little consideration for 
his feelings and right to dignity.  
 
The humiliation he was forced to endure is highlighted by the implicit binary opposition 
where reference is made to the teacher’s pets, thereby placing these children in a 
favoured and privileged position, which serves to emphasise the disenfranchised position 
Stefan found himself in. Specifically, Stefan draws on the egalitarian discourse as an 
ideal and opposes it to the privilege discourse as origin of unfair class divisions, when he 
states: “a fellow pupil as old as me now has to teach me …”. Effectively, Stefan is able to 
legitimise his claim that utter injustices were committed against him throughout his life 
and in various contexts. Another example of the injustice discourse is prevalent when 
Stefan explains his dislike of the snobbish academic type: 
 
Yes, that’s how I feel, yes, they look down upon you, you are rated if you 
can’t spell and write properly, because you’re not an educated human 
being. 
 
Apart from being the cause of severe interpersonal injustices that he has had to endure 
along his way to success, Stefan also describes the personal struggles he faces as a 
consequence of his dyslexia:   
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I think my mental handicap of … I always feel I … like I said to you 
earlier, since my schooldays it broke me down so that I am not that full 
go-getter which I maybe could have been. It shattered it for me since 
school. That is maybe the only negative effect that it left in my life, that I 
always felt unworthy in comparison to many other people, even still now 
sometimes. I’m learning it more now in my life, a lot more due to the type 
of work that I do, where you have to have a much thicker skin. I’m a very 
sensitive person, and now I’m learning to have a much thicker skin just to 
help … 
 
Stefan continues on this train of thought later on in the discussion: 
 
… my dyslexia is my hindrance, it has never been a bridge to me, and it’s 
a hindrance for me where I am now, because now I have to write even 
more reports and paperwork and read contracts. It actually still becomes 
more of a hindrance to me. I overcome it by using my common sense as 
much as possible. 
 
It is clear from the two excerpts above that Stefan utilises a form of counterfactual 
thinking in order to imagine the possibilities that could have been open to him were 
it not for the devastating effects of dyslexia. Effectively dyslexia is objectified as an 
obstructive agent that impedes the purposeful action that would allow Stefan to reach 
his actual potential. If one applies the elements of purposeful action to the above 
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statements, then performing at one’s actual potential would constitute the purpose, 
whereas reaching that actual potential would constitute purposeful action. In other 
words, people without dyslexia reach or strive (purposeful action) to (purpose link) 
perform at their full potential (purpose). However, in Stefan’s case, purposeful action 
would constitute reaching or striving plus overcoming the obstacles of dyslexia in 
order to perform at his full potential.  
 
One can see then that, with the odds stacked against him, he would be able to take 
more credit for his achievements as he has to put in so much more effort to attain 
them. In the ending statements of each excerpt above, Stefan gives instances of how 
he has managed to overcome the obstacles posed by dyslexia. In each case the 
statements are framed in the active voice with Stefan occupying the subject position 
who is busy achieving something. Also, the verbs utilised in these statements suggest 
pro-active behaviour on his part. Thus, in effect, the reality is created where he 
occupies an active role in overcoming the oppressive effects of dyslexia, and 
therefore all success is attributed to his own efforts. Consider the differences in 
meaning, would these statements have been framed differently. For instance, 
consider the differences in meaning should one substitute the frame “I am learning 
…” for the frame “I am being taught …”. 
 
By highlighting the injustice discourse Stefan is able to legitimise his feelings of 
resentment towards those types of people that he categorises as academic snobs. Of 
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course in contexts where power imbalances are definite and clear, a revolution is only 
possible when the playing field is levelled.  
 
It would seem that by drawing on the obstacle discourse Stefan is able to construct a 
reality where his personal achievements are weighed against the struggles he has had to 
face. The emerging image of the immensity of the impediments set by dyslexia serves to 
inflate the gravity of his personal achievements for which he can take sole credit. In as far 
as his perseverance and hard work reflect his ability to transcend hardships and make a 
success of his life, Stefan is able to claim the praise of society for upholding the societal 
values of hard work and success.  
 
Stopping short of bowing to the praise of society, however, Stefan also airs his 
disapproval and resentment of the status quo as upheld by those types of people he refers 
to as academic snobs. Stefan’s rebellion against the status quo finds its legitimation 
through his references to the injustice discourse. As he states, despite his achievements 
the tendency is still for his nemeses to elevate their own importance: 
 
I have a BTech, not a BSc behind my name, and in this old country of 
extreme academic snobbism, the guys make sure that a wall is built to 
separate a technologist and an engineer … there’s a lot more engineers 
than technologists in the country, so they have a strong front of “but 
you’re not really equal to us”. 
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It seems then that to achieve liberation in this context where the power imbalance is so 
definite and clear, the only option is to level the playing field. 
 
Wicked institutions and the foot soldiers of the status quo 
 
Another assumption that is widely held in Western cultures is that of attributing intent to 
evil and in doing so, evil is personified as a twisted humanlike figure or as conniving and 
oppressive institutions. In the previous section, it was found that Stefan utilises the 
injustice discourse to express his fight against oppression and prejudice as a result of his 
dyslexia. Given the complementary nature of relationships, an agent of oppression needs 
to be constructed or identified in order to execute the oppression in question. In this sense 
then, dyslexia provides the basis for the agents of oppression and prejudice to achieve its 
purpose.  
 
While individuals often take on or are given the role of the villain, they are more likely to 
represent the foot soldiers of a larger evil, which often manifest in the guise of seemingly 
helpful, but inherently wicked institutions. Considering the following account, and others 
like it, the impression is created that Stefan’s chief nemesis manifests in the form of 
academic idealism: 
 
She [Stefan’s mother] had this English book and the extra English classes 
that she tried to give me and, uhm, I can see these books in front of me, I 
still get an allergic reaction when I see those books in front of me, and 
   
     104
uhm, my mother tried to teach and drill me and gave reading exercises. 
And, uhm, I had been a bit drilled, so there I already developed a total 
anti in any remedial remedy. 
 
Further on in our discussion, Stefan expands the concept of wicked institutions to include 
individuals as well: 
 
And I remember my one teacher in Standard 9, it is a type of academic 
person, they are highly academically intellectual, he can do paperwork 
with ease, he is good with languages, he is good with writing. If I see a 
person like that I get highly upset. Uhm, I won’t share with that person 
that I have dyslexia, because they just don’t have any comprehension and 
understanding for it, and you often find these guys in business … but with 
the guy on the floor, the artisan on the floor that I see often, oh, we can 
have a good time teasing each other … and it’s ok. 
 
In the first account above, Stefan draws on a personal and specific experience where he 
was forcefully subjected to the academic ideals of his mother. Here the clear message is 
that his mother’s intentions were to help him overcome his reading difficulties, but the 
method of her ways is blamed for his aversion to academic idealism. This is explicitly 
communicated in the final statement of his first account, where he attributes his “anti” to 
remedial remedies to being drilled. Once again the action of being “drilled” evokes 
images of forced compliance and hence relates to the idea of oppression, yet remedial 
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remedy is offered as the official name for this type of academic idealism, thereby 
disguising it as a ‘healing’ practice. Although her intentions might have been good, 
Stefan’s mother is presented here as a foot soldier, or applicant of the greater evil of 
academic idealism, as she bought into and imposed on him one of its guises, namely 
remedial learning. 
 
The second excerpt above goes beyond the institutional level and academic idealism is 
presented as a characteristic that certain individuals possess and that accounts for their 
oppressive and prejudiced attitudes to people, like Stefan, who do not conform to their 
ideals. Stefan attributes his refusal to disclose his dyslexia to these individuals’ inherent 
lack of understanding of the condition. The implicit message is here that their knowledge 
of his condition would provide them with the basis of acting out their oppressive and 
prejudiced natures. 
 
There is also a binary opposition at work in the second excerpt where the academic 
snobbism is contrasted to the more humble artisans on the floor. Stefan’s explicit alliance 
with the artisans then affords him the quality of humility by association and their teasing 
of each other is legitimised by the operation of the commonality discourse. In other 
words, they gain the right to tease each other about their academic deficits due to the fact 
that they share this aspect. In fact, Stefan describes his doubts that the academic idealists 
described above would ever have an understanding for his condition:  
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I don’t think they have the comprehension to understand that people can 
suffer from this. It comes so naturally for them, it’s so easy for them to 
write, that they can’t think … 
 
From this statement the idea clearly emerges that academic idealists will not have the 
ability to comprehend his predicament, due to the fact that they will never have the 
experience of struggling to write, because they are naturals at writing. In other words they 
will not believe it, because they cannot see or experience it. In the following excerpt it 
becomes clear how Stefan utilises the discourse of ‘you’ve got to see it to believe It’: 
 
The irony with these people that I have also recognised is that, in the 
business world they end up as just paper pushers and managers, but they 
are not entrepreneurs. They don’t really make the business world go 
around, they just execute very thoroughly, very clinically, projects or 
business and, uhm, planning and goals … but they aren’t your 
entrepreneurs who can do a thing differently and think differently and the 
like. They are clinical executioners. 
 
Again the academic snobs that are referred to above are presented as very capable and 
efficient individuals owing to their natural talent. However, Stefan points out how this 
natural talent of theirs is actually an impediment to creativity and entrepreneurship by 
virtue of their idealism. Although Stefan does not make explicit mention of himself in the 
above excerpt, one should take note that the discursive context that prevails at this stage 
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of the discussion is one where Stefan is asked to define himself in relation to how other 
people react towards the knowledge of his dyslexia. Stefan then created the opposition 
between himself as a person with dyslexia and the type of academic snob he refers to 
above, which is evident in the following statement:  
 
… I’m going to categorise the person. There is a certain person and it 
comes from grade … from that Standard 1 class with me. That bliksem [a 
derogatory term for an irritating person] who sat there in that corner in 
that class [points to opposite end from where he sat], who is good with 
language, he’s just got the knack for it… 
 
Thus by pointing out the lack of creativity of the “clinical executioners”, as he calls them, 
Stefan implicitly defines himself as possessing the creativity and entrepreneurship that 
are so valued in his occupation. One can therefore argue that Stefan’s abilities to cope 
with the debilitating effects and social stigma of dyslexia are translated into qualities of 
creativity that he can take ownership of. With the scales tipping in his favour, Stefan is 
able to bring about a personal revolution in the construction of his identity, a liberation 
that takes on new meaning in light of his family background. 
 
Daring to be different 
 
As is true for every one of us, heroes, including revolutionaries do not rise out of social 
and familial vacuums. It is known throughout history that the remarkable achievements 
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of revolutionaries such as Nelson Mandela and Ché Guevara are intimately shaped by the 
social, familial and political contexts that helped define them as individuals. Stefan’s 
story is no exception to this observation and he provides numerous accounts of how these 
contexts shaped his perception of self as a person with dyslexia. 
 
Having been born into a well-educated family with significant social status, it seems 
almost ironic that Stefan’s story is constructed with a strong revolutionary narrative 
thread. When one takes a closer look though, one can notice a coherence that binds 
Stefan’s struggle for personal liberation closely to his experiences within his family of 
origin. Stefan’s account of growing up in a highly professional household sheds more 
light on this: 
 
… Both my parents were professional people and I am the last one, and I 
say it straight and I told them, they didn’t raise me, I raised myself, school 
everything. And uhm, I never really had a close relationship with my 
parents. Still now not even with my mother … 
 
Stefan’s description of his parents as professional people draws strongly on the 
oppositional images of family and work where it is often advocated in society that the 
two are mutually exclusive in terms of priority placement. In other words, being labelled 
a professional person the assumption often follows that this person places a higher 
priority on his or her career than on family, and the opposite applies to a family man or 
woman. Thus, Stefan’s word choice, “professional people”, emphasises and also to an 
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extent discursively legitimises his claim that he was afforded little of their time. Being 
the lastborn child further strengthens the idea that his parents ran out of time and patience 
in raising him and therefore he had to tend to his own upbringing. Having lived through 
these conditions, it is little wonder that Stefan would rebel against his family’s 
professional culture and values. 
 
When asked about the reason why he places such a high premium on family, Stefan 
offers the following response: 
 
Yes and no. I see my mother’s faults and I am a lot of my mother, and my 
mother, look I am an academic person, a thinker, and my mother decided 
that her career is more important to her than her children. And I saw it, I 
saw the consequences of it, then I decided the opposite. 
 
When considering these statements, it is evident that Stefan’s relationships with his 
parents had a big impact on his aversion to academic idealism. By using the working man 
or woman discourse Stefan highlights the devastating effects it had when his parents 
chose work over him. Here the notion of professional idealism, which is closely linked to 
academic idealism, is placed in the floodlights once more.  
 
Notice that Stefan’s mother is presented as having made a conscious and deliberate 
choice to place her career first. By pointing out his similarities with his mother, Stefan 
presents himself with the same family-work dilemma that his mother faced. Due to the 
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fact that Stefan describes himself as an academic and thinker, just like his mother, his 
choice to place his family first gains much more gravity since it entails a sacrifice that his 
mother was never willing to make. In effect, Stefan is able to highlight his own decisive 
power, despite his professional ambitions, and he presents himself as having the ability to 
resist the temptations of professional idealism. 
 
The differences between Stefan and his family seem to have played an important role in 
his current construction of his identity. Stefan mentions the difficulties he had to endure 
as a result of his family’s lack of acceptance of something he claims to have no control 
over: 
 
Where I came from an academic family, and a dad who was fantastic at 
spelling and brothers and sisters who were fantastic in English and 
writing essays, and I couldn’t do it. So it was obvious to everyone, and 
thus not acceptable. 
 
Here the differences between Stefan and his family take on special significance. Having 
defined his family as an academic and professional family, Stefan proceeds to point out 
his inability to perform well in English and writing essays. Importantly, in this account he 
attributes his difficulties with language to his lack of abilities, whereby they become 
something he has no control over and cannot change. He then describes the other 
members of his family as possessing exceptional language abilities, which create a 
polarity that divides him from them.  
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The salience discourse then serves to underline the alienation he had to endure for 
something he could not change. It must be said again that the agent of oppression is not 
so much his family members, but rather the academic idealism they subscribe to, as it 
was this idealism that served to underscore his difference from them and robbed him of a 
caring family. 
 
Revolution personified 
 
Considering Stefan’s background and the difficulties he faced while growing up, it would 
be hard not to be impressed by what he has achieved in life. A great deal of his 
conversation on his experience of growing up with dyslexia is focussed on the various 
personal and interpersonal difficulties he encountered, some of which he attributes to 
dyslexia itself, while mostly his difficulties are indirectly related to it, such as people’s 
lack of understanding of Dyslexia. For instance, he mentions the following: 
 
Uhm, so the word dyslexia did not bother me. To hell with people. I mean 
you also learn to develop a thick skin against things like that, but the label 
of I cannot read, and I cannot spell, that bothered me at school, because 
that was obvious to everyone. 
 
In this statement Stefan explicitly defines his biggest difficulty not to be the label of 
dyslexia, but rather the symptoms or behavioural components that underlie the label. In 
other words, he draws a distinction between the label dyslexia and the reading and 
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spelling abilities that it refers to. As long as the difficulties with reading and writing are 
attributed to dyslexia, they are externalised, and Stefan is able to shrug it off. However, 
when people attribute his difficulties to a lack of abilities on his part, then Stefan was 
bothered by it. Furthermore, seeing that people at his school did not grasp what dyslexia 
was, any reading and writing difficulties were likely to be attributed to his lack of ability 
rather than to dyslexia.  
 
However, in contrast to his hardships, Stefan also relates numerous ways in which he has 
overcome these ‘dyslexia difficulties’ by drawing on his inherent personal qualities: 
 
1) Researcher: [Would you say that] … you developed certain qualities, 
which otherwise … 
2) Stefan: … I would rather say that I’ve found ways to cope and deal 
with it … I think the qualities that I have as a person, I would have had 
the same qualities whether I had dyslexia or not. I am a technical 
person by nature, I have very strong values in the business world with 
the manner to handle a client and function. I can decide very strong, 
be decisive, I can take very strong ownership of a problem and sort it 
out or take responsibility for the results that go wrong. And these are 
characteristics of me as person. Now if I could spell or not, those 
characteristics could not change. 
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My question in Turn 1 is a request for Stefan to consider his personal qualities in terms of 
how they might have been influenced by his learning experiences, especially experiences 
related to dyslexia. Stefan denies owing any of his personal qualities to dyslexia and 
attributes all his admirable achievements to his innate qualities. Stefan subtly underplays 
any contribution of nurture, or lived experience and learning, to his commendable 
personal qualities. By defining dyslexia in its simplest form in the above, i.e. as an 
inability to spell, and posing the possibility of it having played a role in determining his 
personal qualities, becomes a ridiculous question. This is because the relational aspect of 
the way in which his contexts were shaped by his having the label dyslexia is removed 
from the equation, leaving no room for the nurture side of the opposition.  
 
Therefore, the nature versus nurture contingency plays a significant role in his 
construction of his identity. Remember that Stefan defines his dyslexia solely as a 
hindrance and therefore, by attributing all his achievements to innate qualities, he is able 
to take sole ownership for it. Also, as stated earlier, dyslexia as a hindrance serves to 
inflate the gravity of his personal achievements by virtue of its opposition to it. 
Therefore, the nature versus nurture discourse aids Stefan to highlight his achievements 
in spite of the oppressive forces related to his dyslexia. Accordingly Stefan can claim his 
liberation from the seeds of doubt in his own worthiness that was planted through 
academic idealism and its foot soldiers. 
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Leaving a legacy for generations to come 
 
The image of society as consisting of organised systems of individuals as well as larger 
than life ideals and values implies a delicate balance and synchronicity of its components 
in order to maintain proper balance and hence organicity. It would thus follow that every 
act of conformity or defiance impacts on this balance, but very few disrupt it to an extent 
that they bring about a new order in society. Individual revolutionaries may be the faces 
of change, but whether their efforts are significant in history depends on the generations 
that follow.  
 
Similarly, Stefan’s personal liberation might be framed as a personal revolution, but it 
does not mean that he has changed society or even impacted on academic idealism as a 
wicked institution. His victory is rather a moral one, but it is a victory nonetheless, for it 
has implications for how he relates to those individuals in his immediate surroundings. 
More importantly, his struggle for liberation from the stigma of dyslexia holds 
implications for how he relates to his children, the generation to follow: 
 
I can’t really say that it impacted on my relationships, but of course, I 
keep an eye on them to see what their abilities are … something that I can 
say it influenced, look library time is an important time in the week and I 
make sure it happens, and I made sure that I get my children to read, 
because that’s something my parents did not do with me, and it might have 
helped to dyslexia. 
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After providing an account of his daughter’s zest for reading, Stefan continues with his 
thoughts: 
 
That is something I am very proud of, you know, but I taught them, I got 
them to read. Uhm, with my laaitie [an Afrikaans colloquial term of 
endearment, referring to a male child], we are naturally very sensitive 
with education, and maybe the fact that I have dyslexia I’m very, very 
understanding and patient to teach him to speak, you know, we are now on 
the talking phase … so I put in a disturbing amount of effort on interactive 
talking with him … 
 
From his accounts above, it is evident how Stefan draws on the nurture discourse to make 
salient the intergenerational revolution that has occurred. Specifically he utilises his 
parents’ lack of purposeful action to encourage him to read in order to posit a causal link 
to his developing dyslexia. An interesting contrast to take note of is the different contexts 
in which the nature versus nurture discourses are applied in Stefan’s story. Remember 
that Stefan utilised the nature discourse to take ownership of his own achievements, and 
the challenges he was confronted with as a result of dyslexia served to inflate these 
achievements. Here Stefan draws on the nurture discourse to illustrate how his dyslexia 
might have come about.  
 
The differential use of the nature versus nurture discourses then finds importance in the 
purpose it serves for Stefan’s construction of self as an individual possessing personal 
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agency to control his environment. If he, for instance, were to utilise the nature discourse 
to account for his dyslexia, it would imply that dyslexia is an innate quality of Stefan’s 
being and the humiliation he endured could not be helped. Such a construction would 
leave little room for personal agency in order to make an impact on his children’s futures. 
However, the nurture discourse suggests that something can be done to prevent or limit 
the impact of dyslexia and other conditions, such as Down’s syndrome.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In his story of liberation it is evident how Stefan combines and contrasts various societal 
discourses in relation to his dyslexia and its stigma to construct his identity as a person 
living with dyslexia. The nature versus nurture discourses are good examples of these 
discursive interactions that allow Stefan to construct himself as an empowered individual 
in that he can avoid the mistakes his parents made with him by taking more interest in his 
children’s performances. In fact, as he affected this intergenerational revolution, Stefan 
has more to be proud of than simply his personal liberation from the stigma of dyslexia, 
for his appreciation of the remarkable struggle he endured inspires him to do things 
differently with his children and thereby leave a legacy in their lives. In this sense, it 
might be true that heroes are born by a wish to change the world, but it is through 
remembrance of their brave attempts that heroes are immortalised.  
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With the conclusion of Stefan’s story, the focus will now shift to the third and final 
participant in this study. Marietjie’s experiences of adapting to her anxiety attacks and the 
revelation that she has an anxiety disorder are discussed in more details below. 
 
Anxiety Disorder: An heir to the throne 
 
Marietjie,
4
 an Afrikaans-speaking, white woman, is a dedicated wife and mother of two 
boys, and is currently assisting her eldest son’s girlfriend with her pregnancy. She is 
currently 35 years old and confesses that she is very excited about the birth of her first 
grandchild, although the stress that comes with the pregnancy causes her to become very 
anxious at times. On 1 January 2009, after celebrating the New Year with her colleagues 
from the supermarket where she worked, Marietjie had a severe episode of extreme 
anxiety at work. Later her doctor would diagnose her with an anxiety disorder, i.e. what 
she calls “anxiety attacks”.  
 
Marietjie’s childhood was characterised by her assuming much responsibility at home, 
and she made the decision to leave school at the age of 15 years to help out at home. 
Although she thinks of herself as a housewife, Marietjie admits that she enjoyed working 
at the deli in the supermarket, and she regrets that she had to give up her job after being 
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder. Although her journey of adjusting to living with an 
anxiety disorder has been fairly brief, her dedication, hope and faith for a fulfilling future 
have brought her a long way in going forward. 
 
                                                 
4
 Real name is used on participant’s request. 
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The day the crown dropped to the floor 
 
When one considers the words of Romeo’s tormented lover Juliet, “a rose by any other 
name would smell as sweet”, one can infer the message that names are arbitrary strings of 
letters that only obtain their meanings through their association with the objects they refer 
to. Therefore, if one were to change your name from Jack to John, one could reason that 
you would still remain the same person and your new name would have the same 
meaning to those around you, as the old one had.  
 
If one considers, however, that all names are given to people by certain other people who 
have certain reasons for their choice of names, then it becomes clear that the meanings of 
names are not arbitrary and do not reside in the object or person who it refers to. For 
instance, whether your mother chose your name merely because it had a nice ring to it, 
she still had a reason for christening you with it and thus your name carries a certain 
history and consequently has certain meanings to those around you.  
 
The reason I share the above argument is because I see a definite relevance in it with 
regard to Marietjie’s feelings of panic and confusion after her first intense encounter with 
anxiety. In the following excerpt, Marietjie draws on the naming discourse, which 
suggests that the name of the problem contains the solution to it: 
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1) Researcher: … so you say that you had this [anxiety] attack, but you 
didn’t know what it was, did you perhaps have any ideas in your mind 
about what could be wrong? 
2) Marietjie: No, no, no, I was very nervous, because I didn’t know what 
was wrong with me. And the anxiety scared me, because now you don’t 
know what is wrong with you. 
 
Further in the discussion she elaborates on the importance of her search for the correct 
diagnosis: 
 
3) Marietjie: … I started crying later on. I told my husband that I can’t 
carry on like this, because I don’t know what’s going on with me, and 
the doctor keeps saying I have the flu. He then said “I’m 
accompanying you to the doctor now, until he’s sorted out everything, 
you can stay there with him”, because later on I started to feel like I’d 
commit suicide, because I don’t know what’s wrong with me. And the 
anxiety only got worse and worse, because I’m not being diagnosed 
properly. 
 
What is clear in the content of Marietjie’s accounts above is the sheer degree of 
discomfort she experienced as a result of not having an official name to give to her 
troublesome experiences. In Turn 1 above, my question is posed as a request for Marietjie 
to reflect on the meanings she attributed to her experiences in the absence of having an 
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official name for them. Again, as with all reflective accounts of experiences, the 
meanings are not recalled from the past, but they are created in the present process of 
reflection and presented as if they existed back then. Therefore, my inherent request is for 
Marietjie to engage in the act of constructing these meanings of the events in the past. 
 
In Turn 2 Marietjie declines answering the explicit question of what her personal theories 
were regarding what could be wrong, but responds to the implicit request by reflecting on 
her lack of understanding what was wrong. Here it becomes imperative to notice the 
attribution of purpose as a means to legitmise her experiences.  
 
By using the three elements of purposeful action, her statement can be presented as 
follows: I was very nervous [purpose] + because [purpose link] + I didn’t know what was 
wrong with me [purposeful action/state]. Thus her anxiety is posed as a consequence of 
her insufficient explanatory modes, and can also be presented as follows: I didn’t know 
what was wrong with me, therefore I became very anxious. This statement then presents 
Marietjie with a course of action in getting a grip on what she was experiencing, that is to 
name it and explain it.  
 
The importance of finding the official name for her problem is highlighted in Turn 3, 
where she juxtaposes the necessity of naming her problem with the drastic option of 
suicide, thereby creating a dilemma. Accordingly, the necessity of discovering the correct 
name for her problem is elevated to a matter of life or death.  
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In the last statement in Turn 3, Marietjie again attributes her worsening anxiety to her 
state of not being able to explain it, but this time the purposeful action (or lack thereof) 
resides in an agent separate from herself, namely the doctor. As doctors perform the 
function of diagnosticians in society, their failure to provide an official and satisfactory 
name for her problem highlights the link between not knowing and her intensifying 
anxiety, thereby further legitimising the need to name her problem.  
 
By drawing on the naming discourse, Marietjie emphasises the lack of agency she 
experienced as a result of not being able to explain or give meaning to her experiences of 
anxiety. Although she reports being devastated to find out that her official diagnosis is an 
anxiety disorder, Marietjie does report that this knowledge provides some relief and 
feelings of control: “Now I can handle it a bit better, because I know it’s my anxiety 
attacks, and I keep saying to myself when it happens: ‘I’m going to be alright’”. Having 
officialised her condition as anxiety disorder, she can now proceed to ‘discover’ its 
underlying meanings and work towards making changes in her life. Her conviction of the 
necessity to be diagnosed properly leads to a different but related discourse, also 
prominent in her story. 
 
To catch a crown 
 
Marietjie’s insistence on establishing the real name for her experiences of anxiety seems 
to operate on the logic that by finding its name – its real name – the diagnosis as a sign 
might point to something beneath the surface, something that might have caused the 
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problem to come into being. The hope would then be that knowing the nature and cause 
of the problem might suggest possible ways or areas to attend to in order to arrive at a 
solution to her problem. As she describes: 
 
1) Researcher: … if I would have to ask you now, what is your diagnosis, 
what would you tell me? Like what is your disorder? 
2) Marietjie: I would say to you now that I get anxiety attacks, yes. I get 
anxious when I start to stress, or anxious when I start to get worried, 
or uhm, how can I say, if a person, if something looks like it can be 
dangerous or something, then I get anxious, yes. But most of the time it 
is like Amands [her psychologist] said, I get anxious if I, uhm, feel that 
I must help people and like when I see people are in danger or 
something. 
 
The emerging definition of our interactive context, as framed in my question, is an 
informative one. Consequently, my question to Marietjie is seemingly purely based 
on seeking a factual answer, i.e. that she is diagnosed with anxiety disorder. 
However, as seen from Marietjie’s response in Turn 2, she personalises her answer 
by saying “I would say …” thereby drawing on her own understanding of what her 
problem is, and she redefines the interactive activity as one of informing through 
personal reflection. This suggests that her definition of her problem reflects the 
personal meanings that she has attached to it, and therefore draws on the name as a 
sign discourse. 
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In her first statement in Turn 2, Marietjie defines her problem in terms of the official 
diagnosis of “anxiety attacks” and it becomes an entity in itself. The problem is thereby 
objectified and she distances herself from it. Therefore, anxiety attacks become an 
external infliction that invades her day-to-day life, something over which she has no 
power other than to defend herself from it. In the remainder of her statements in Turn 2, 
Marietjie proceeds to offer the meanings behind her anxiety attacks and eventually ends 
up with a relational definition of the problem.  
 
There is a gradual progression in her definition of the problem she is faced with as she 
reflects on the underlying meanings thereof. For instance, in her second statement in Turn 
2, Marietjie defines her problem as an emotional state that resides in herself, but it is 
something that is brought about by her other mood states, like being worried. This 
intrapersonal framing of her problem allows for some degree of personal agency, but this 
agency relies on her annihilation or avoidance of other natural mood states. Therefore, if 
she can avoid being worried, she can control her anxiety.  
 
The difficulty that is clearly evident in Marietjie’s attempts to define the meanings behind 
her problem suggests a search for a satisfactory explanation in terms of purposeful action. 
Her statement “uhm, how can I say …” suggests that she was unsatisfied with the 
explanation provided before, and will continue to express a more satisfactory definition. 
Marietjie then starts with a relational definition, “if a person …”, but then negates it 
immediately after by correcting her statement (I added the negating word for illustrative 
purposes): “if a person, [no] if something …”.   
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In finally arriving at a relational definition of her problem, Marietjie utilises a form of 
legitimation known as authorisation. She is able to legitimise a relational definition, 
which seems to be most satisfying to Marietjie in terms of its meanings, by referencing an 
expert on the field. Here her psychologist is credited for the relational definition that adds 
legitimacy to her interpretation by virtue of the expert discourse. Her final statement in 
Turn 2 above, “I get anxious if I … feel that I must help people …” no longer situates the 
problem in Marietjie herself. Rather the problem is situated in the way she relates to 
others. Therefore, the framing of the statement (via the word must) indicates that her 
helping actions are motivated by duty to others, and also that others contribute to the 
problem by making her feel she has a duty towards helping them. This relational frame 
then provides more possibilities for personal agency on Marietjie’s part, as the meanings 
she ‘discovered’ that explain why she is anxious point to a need to alter her interpersonal 
roles. 
 
Sharing the weight of a crown 
 
If one accepts that all names acquire meanings as a result of the interpersonal nature of 
naming processes, the resulting historicity that accompanies names mean that people 
inherit certain expectations to live up to as a function of their names. This is most clearly 
illustrated in the inheritance of family names. For instance, when a mother decides that 
her son should be named after his father, her decision is made in a certain context which 
affords it certain historical significance.  
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For example, take a couple that has had difficulties conceiving and finally gave birth to 
their first child ten years after their first attempt to extend their family. This child is then 
their first child and potentially the only child they might conceive, and happens to be a 
boy. Given these contextual factors, the decision of naming this child after his father 
likely carries with it the significant, yet implicit expectations that he would represent his 
father as well as his hopes and dreams for carrying the family values into the future. In 
such a case, his name would be imbued with certain responsibilities and expectations that 
symbolise how his parents might relate to him, even from before his birth.  
 
Being part of a family herself, Marietjie also occupies certain roles that are governed by 
the names she carries and the symbolic meanings they have for those intimately 
connected to her. Marietjie is not only Marietjie, but she is also mother, wife, daughter 
and friend to those people who care for her. Furthermore, the roles that she occupies do 
not remain static over time, but evolve with the addition of new labels carrying new 
symbolic meanings. 
 
It can be argued that the symbolic nature of names holds true for most labels that people 
appropriate over time and informs much of how our roles are defined within our family 
systems (Andolfi, 1983). After having appropriated the anxiety disorder label, Marietjie 
describes the impact it had on her role as a member of her nuclear family network: 
 
1) Marietjie: … Ok, my husband supports me a lot and it helped a lot. 
He’s terribly supportive, my children as well … 
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2) Researcher: How does your family support you in terms of [the anxiety 
disorder]? 
3) Marietjie: Yes they support me a lot. For them it’s also still a new 
thing. If my youngest son, if he, he says “Mom, don’t you want to lie 
down for a bit, or, or go and rest a bit?” And he’s very worried and 
uhm, luckily when I get the anxiety attacks then I try to keep it away 
from him, because I don’t want him to see it … 
 
My question to Marietjie in Turn 2 is an invitation to elaborate on the support she 
mentioned receiving in Turn 1 above. Essentially, I am asking her to provide examples of 
what she perceives support to be. The emerging definition of our communicative activity 
becomes one of outlining the perceived changes in her roles in the family. 
 
In Turn 2 Marietjie reconfirms the amount of support she receives as she mentioned in 
Turn 1, after which she provides legitimation for her family’s reaction, in that they are 
still adapting to the new situation. This might indicate that the support her family thinks 
they provide is not exactly the type of support she actually needs. This interpretation is 
confirmed by her account of her son’s worried reaction towards her anxiety. After giving 
this account, Marietjie offers the statement “… when I get the anxiety attacks then I try to 
keep it away from him …”. This statement suggests that her family’s worries about her, 
which she previously defined as support, actually become another stoke in her fire to 
which she must attend.  
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To appreciate her statement, one should keep in mind the prescriptive roles that preside in 
family contexts. Being a mother, Marietjie’s prescribed role is to protect her children 
from the worries of the world. It would then seem natural that Marietjie experiences dis-
ease in the sudden reversal of roles, where her son now becomes worried about her. 
Marietjie confirms this interpretation later on in our discussion when she says:  
 
I am scared that they would be worried about me all the time, and that 
they rather, like the youngest one, that they rather concentrate on their 
schoolwork and be with his friends. I don’t want him to see a depressed 
mother. He must feel happy, and not feel that he can’t go here or there 
now, because his mother is not feeling well … 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, Marietjie describes herself as having 
been a dutiful person from early on in her life. Being duty-bound, she has had to make 
many sacrifices in her life in order to assume the responsibilities of taking care of others. 
As mentioned earlier, the official underlying meaning of her anxiety disorder that she 
bought into is that her anxiety is caused by a feeling of duty towards others. This then 
implies that Marietjie’s sense of duty has become extreme and detrimental to her 
wellbeing. When she appropriated the anxiety disorder label, the notion of family support 
became yet another duty that she was benevolently expected to accept, as she explains:  
 
1) Researcher: …what were your family’s more immediate reactions 
[after her being diagnosed]? 
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2) Marietjie: My husband immediately said “You’re not going back to 
work, there is too much stress at work”. I should get more relaxed at 
home. 
3) Researcher: Was that what you hoped for? Was it the manner you 
hoped he would react? 
4) Marietjie: No. 
5) Researcher: How would you have liked it …? 
6) Marietjie: Uhm, I would have liked them to say “Ok, it will come right, 
go back to work”. But he said “You’re not going back to work, there’s 
not a chance. You can stay at home, relax more”. 
 
Marietjie’s admission of her disappointment in her husband’s reaction indicates the 
dissonance that she experiences with regard to the support she receives from her family. 
Notice that her definition of what she perceived support to be in Turn 6 is at direct odds 
with her husband’s decision of what he presumed to be in the best interest of her 
wellbeing. The benevolent intent of his decision would make it hard for Marietjie to 
oppose his decision, especially given the context in which his decision is made. Because 
of the symbolic meaning of the anxiety label, Marietjie’s family members are alerted to 
the fact that she needs to be protected from stress. Thus, the empathy discourse serves to 
legitimise her husband’s decision that her continuing work would harm her further.  
 
Having bought into the anxiety label herself, especially given its explanations regarding 
the causes of her anxiety attacks, Marietjie finds it difficult to oppose her husband’s 
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decision. In response to my question regarding what the communicative value of her 
husband’s choice was to her, Marietjie has the following to say:  
 
1) Researcher: The fact that he told you that you shouldn’t go back to 
work, what does it say to you about yourself? 
2) Marietjie: That I, that my body isn’t as, can’t go on as I’ve done in the 
past, yes.  
 
By asking her to reflect on the communicative value of her husband’s decision in Turn 1, 
I invite Marietjie to interpret her husband’s decision in terms of what it implies about her 
perception of self. Marietjie’s statement in Turn 2 again draws on the name as a sign 
discourse. Although it is her husband’s decision that is interpreted as a sign that she 
should change her lifestyle, her interpretation still draws on her diagnosis as the basis for 
her husband’s decision. Therefore, while Marietjie’s appropriation of the anxiety label 
holds certain meanings for her family members, her interpretations of how they react 
towards her seem to have certain implications for how she defines her identity. In this 
regard, her family’s reactions reinforce the reality suggested by the name as a sign 
discourse, i.e. that she needs to alter her lifestyle and become less dutiful. In this sense 
Marietjie’s duties in her family are redefined and it can be said that her new duty towards 
her family is to be less dutiful. 
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Advisors to the throne 
 
It is often the case that people find that despite their best efforts to prevent it, they turn 
out to be very similar to their parents. Similarly, there also seems to be a great tendency 
for people to suffer the same difficulties and develop the same ailments as their parents, 
which in systemic terms are referred to as intergenerational patterns or redundancies 
(Becvar & Becvar, 2000). Such intergenerational patterns make it hard to dismiss the 
possibility that people can achieve different outcomes despite being afflicted with the 
same difficulties as their parents. In other words, it sometimes feels as if the apple does 
not fall far from the tree, but rather on top of it. 
 
Having had personal experience with her mother’s anxiety attacks, Marietjie describes 
her fears when she found out that the same fate has befallen her: 
 
… the thing is, my mother is already so far along with her pills that she 
can’t go off it. And it doesn’t make her a good, a good person. On the 
contrary, it makes her an ugly person. Sometimes she gets mood swings … 
The one day she is good, another day she will swear at you out of the blue, 
and stuff like that. I don’t want to become like that, yes. That was my 
biggest fear. 
 
In this account Marietjie draws on her personal experience of her mother’s difficulties 
with anxiety to draw parallels to her own possibilities. It could be said that her mother’s 
   
     131
behaviours represent a possible blueprint for what her life can become, given the 
similarity of the condition they share. Marietjie’s explicit use of the good/bad binary 
opposition emphasises her disapproval of her mother’s behaviour, yet this behaviour is 
attributed to the medication and not as a characteristic of her mother. Lastly, her mother 
is presented as lacking decisive power in coping without her medication, which creates a 
pretty grim and rigid image of what it means to have an anxiety disorder. In the final two 
statements in the preceding excerpt, Marietjie distances herself from the image created, 
effectively communicating that she does not buy into this rigid image. Notice that the 
statement “I don’t want to become like that” is framed in the future tense, thereby 
indicating a wish or intention, whereas the statement “That was my biggest fear” 
indicates that her fear has already been extinguished.  
 
In renouncing the rigid image her mother has sculpted for her regarding what to expect in 
her future, Marietjie enlists the hopeful image that she is able to construct with the 
support of her other advisor, her sister-in-law: 
 
1) Marietjie: The one wants to tell you you’re going spend the rest of my 
life, my mother, she says to me I’m going to spend the rest of my life 
living with pills and stuff, which I don’t want to do, and my sister-in-
law says it will get better sooner or later, that I can live without the 
pills, yes. 
2) Researcher: … who do you believe? 
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3) Marietjie: My sister-in-law. The reason is, she also worked as a nurse 
for years, and now only went on pension. So I trust her, her mother 
also had anxiety attacks, so. 
 
In Turn 1 above, Marietjie defines the possibilities of her future outcomes in terms of 
the contingent images as posed by her mother and sister-in-law, both of whom have 
personal experience with anxiety disorder. After Marietjie presents her mother’s 
image, she explicitly renounces her agreement with it in terms of her own wish. The 
framing of her renouncing statement, “I don’t want to …” presents her as an agent 
with decisive power to choose the course of her future. Her sister-in-law’s testament 
to her hope for a better life is then presented. Notice that the framing “I can live 
without the pills …” reiterates the possibility for decisive power. The effect created 
by the framings of these hopeful images is one of empowerment, where Marietjie is 
presented as having options to determine her own outcomes. 
 
In Turn 3 Marietjie explicitly announces her allegiance with her sister-in-law’s 
predictions, and proceeds to legitimise her belief through appealing to her sister-in-
law’s personal as well as professional experience with anxiety attacks that spans over 
years. Marietjie’s construction of herself as an individual with choices and power to 
determine her own outcomes is therefore strengthened by the authority that her 
sister-in-law’s experience affords her predictions. 
 
 
   
     133
Making the time to fly 
 
There seems to come a time in every person’s life, where the task to individuate from the 
family mass is an important and imperative function of your own benefit. Having spent 
most of her life sacrificing her own needs in the name of duty to her family, Marietjie has 
now come to a place where she is kinder to herself. As she describes: 
 
I am more relaxed, I’m more relaxed now yes … If, on the day, I really 
don’t feel like cleaning, then I just sweep the floor and clean so that it 
looks clean, and then I take it easy, take the rest of the day off. Uhm, 
before the anxiety attacks, the house had to be spring-cleaned every day, 
must be clean. Everything must be perfect. Now I’m not as fussy about it, 
if there is a bit of dust on the television, then I’ll leave it … 
 
Marietjie’s current description of herself is in stark contrast to the one before her anxiety 
disorder diagnosis. Particularly, she now presents herself as having power to make 
choices whether to clean or not. Her day-to-day activities prior to her diagnosis are 
described as having been governed by a compulsive drive, something that she had to do 
and had no control over. Marietjie’s construction of self has developed into one of a 
person who possesses the agency to make her own decisions and accept responsibility for 
her choices. 
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The anxiety disorder diagnosis then, as disruptive and devastating as it is, has made an 
important input into Marietjie’s family system. Through its symbolic meanings that 
impact on how Marietjie and her family members think and act, being diagnosed with 
anxiety disorder served to disrupt the family balance that kept Marietjie in her dutiful 
role: 
 
… Before I had to do things. When it was someone’s birthday, then I had 
to bake a cake and make party stuff. Nowadays when it’s someone’s 
birthday or something and I don’t feel in the mood, then I’ll say “No, I 
don’t have the energy for it”. 
 
She also describes the positive changes that she made as a result of her shifting roles. 
Particularly, she seems to relish the freedom she enjoys now and the appreciation that she 
has for every moment of life. Marietjie describes this feeling in response to my question 
of whether she notices any positive differences in herself as a result of her diagnosis and 
the experiences that followed: 
 
No not really. Just the fact that I now take every day, I always, oh planned 
things a week before the time, nowadays I take it one day at a time … I try 
to live every day that I have to the fullest of my ability. Like if my child 
says “Mom, let’s go to the mall”, then I always said “Oh, let’s go 
tomorrow or the day after”. Now I say “Ok, let’s go”, because I have 
   
     135
now, maybe tomorrow won’t exist anymore, yes … I try to live every day 
in the full, that’s all that changed me, my view on life. 
 
It is evident then that through her experiences and struggles with adjusting to her 
diagnosis, Marietjie managed to construct the meanings that resulted in the choice of 
changing her lifestyle. Above she draws on the final day discourse to legitimise the 
current choices that previously would not have stuck with her. The effect of her self-
description above is that the ‘new’ Marietjie is presented as a more spontaneous 
individual who is in control of her choices and takes responsibility for them. She also 
hints at the notion that the changes she has made are long-term ones, in that she defines 
them as a change in her “view on life”. This has a further empowering effect on Marietjie 
as she can attribute any positives changes to her new vision on life. Thus, the implication 
is that her new view on life would affect how she approaches every aspect of life. 
 
It might be tempting to assume that Marietjie has fallen for the pleasures of secondary 
gain and the abdication of her responsibilities, but she states: 
 
… I don’t want to be pitied. I have always been a strong person, and I 
don’t want them [referring to her family] to pity me, or feel sorry for me. 
 
Marietjie then reinforces her responsibilities with regard to her condition and the 
possibilities of affecting her own outcomes in life: “Yes, I don’t know whether I’m going 
to have it for the rest of my life, because the thing is anxiety can be overcome” and “But 
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the thing is that it is anxiety attacks and there is nothing that can make it better for you, 
except you yourself, or with time”. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is important to note how Marietjie had utilised the various discourses that come into 
play in her family dynamics to adjust her perception of self after having had her first 
anxiety attack. Through the reflective process of our conversation, it came to light that 
Marietjie always defined her role as one of sacrifice; where her function as caregiver and 
helper to others became rigid and inflexible. Her comparison of her interpersonal role at 
present (i.e. allowing more time for herself) as compared to before her diagnosis, 
suggests a definite impression of change that she picked up on and framed as growth. It is 
also important to note that her recognition of her ‘growth’ occurred within a context of 
reflection and in response to questions that request her to attribute meanings to certain 
experiences. Therefore, the growth she recognised in herself is not necessarily an inherent 
effect of her being diagnosed with anxiety attacks, but was constructed in the process of 
searching for meanings of her experiences in a reflective exercise. In this sense, it can be 
said that I joined Marietjie in a collaborative effort to construct and negotiate the effects 
of anxiety disorder on her self-perception, and thereby in the construction of her identity. 
 
Having presented the results of the three participants, the focus in Chapter 5 shifts to a 
discussion and integration of the results into various process themes. Thereafter, a 
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discussion of the strengths and limitations of this study is afforded and recommendations 
for further research in the field of diagnostic labelling are outlined. 
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Chapter 5 – Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In the preceding chapters, a critical discussion of the various perspectives regarding the 
effects of diagnostic labels on individuals’ identities and sense of personal agency was 
offered. In Chapter 1, the aim of the study was framed as an exploration of diagnostically 
labelled individuals’ identity constructions as empowered individuals with the capacity 
for personal agency through the meanings derived from various social discourses, thereby 
reframing their diagnostic labels as interpersonal metaphors.  
 
Chapter 2 focussed on the existing literature and theoretical conceptualisations of 
labelling, including social psychological explanations, labelling theory, systemic 
perspectives and social constructionist views. The epistemological foundations of the 
study were made explicit and arguments for the applicability of the social constructionist 
epistemology with its emphasis on narrative constructions of reality were presented. 
 
In Chapter 3, the focus shifted to the methods of application of the research assumptions 
to address the aim of the study. The method of analysis, namely discourse analysis, 
required an explicit and critical consideration of my central role, as researcher, in shaping 
the narratives and hence the meanings that participants attach to their experiences. 
Attention was given to the effects of the questions I posed, the possibilities that are 
facilitated or restricted by these questions, as well as the subjective nature of the 
interpretive process when analysing participants’ data. Accordingly, my interpretations of 
participants’ results were offered in Chapter 4 and the collaborative nature of meaning-
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making between researcher and participant was emphasised. Various discourses that 
underlie the meanings that participants derived from their experiences of adapting to their 
diagnostic labels were discussed in a narrative plot that illustrates the interaction among 
these discourses in the meaning-construction process. 
 
Having briefly considered the foregoing chapters and the progression of focus each 
presents, this chapter will embodies an endeavour to integrate the results obtained from 
Chapter 4 and to offer a critical account thereof in light of the existing literature and 
theoretical perspectives, as well as the study’s research assumptions. This integrative 
discussion is guided by an effort to assess the success of the research endeavour to 
achieve the aim of the study, as proposed in Chapter 1. Accordingly, this chapter will 
concludes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of the study and 
recommendations for future research in the field of diagnostic labelling. 
 
Integration of results 
 
Departing from the view that diagnostic labels hold implications that are inherently good 
or bad to those individuals who are diagnosed with it, this study was approached from a 
social constructionist epistemology. The adoption of a social constructionist 
epistemology held the implication that participants were viewed as active agents in the 
constructions of their identities in lieu of the meanings they derived from their 
experiences with these labels in relation to significant others. Accordingly, participants’ 
results were analysed for the interpersonal effects their diagnostic labels held for them. 
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Attention was also paid to the ways in which they constructed their identities by way of 
the meanings they derived from those interpersonal experiences that pertained to their 
diagnostic labels.  
 
Apart from the subsequent effects of being diagnosed with a diagnostic label, the 
analyses of participants’ results also revealed that their personal, interpersonal and 
vocational expectations and goals prior to their diagnoses played an important mediating 
role in their identity constructions. This is because these expectations and goals 
invariably formed a basis for the meanings they derived from their experiences of 
adapting to their diagnostic labels. As such, participants presented their experiences of 
adapting to their diagnostic labels as significant learning curves, as they afforded them 
opportunities for reflecting on various aspects of their lives prior to their diagnoses. 
Through such reflection the recognition of the necessity of personal, interpersonal or 
occupational growth in these domains of life became paramount.  
 
It seems that this reflective process that is facilitated, to some extent, by the diagnostic 
labels and interpersonal experiences surrounding it, allowed participants to compare their 
current functioning in specific domains of living to that prior to the diagnostic events. 
Consequently, through these reflecting and retrospective comparing processes the 
experience of personal growth was facilitated in participants. Furthermore, since the 
diagnostic labels were mostly framed as external or objectified conditions that afflict 
participants, they symbolise hindrances to participants’ adaptations. However, diagnostic 
labels as ‘hindrances’ combined with participants’ experiences of having achieved 
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growth in various domains of functioning, despite these hindrances, serve to bolster their 
identity constructions as empowered individuals and survivors of adverse conditions.  
 
Following the latter argument, the diagnostic events as reflected in participants’ stories 
can be conceptualised as perturbations that served to provoke reflections and that 
challenged the existing organisations of participants’ systems of functioning (i.e. self as a 
system, self in system and system in context). This statement resonates with the second-
order cybernetic conceptualisation of psychotherapy, where psychotherapeutic 
intervention is framed as an act aimed at disrupting the rigidified homeostatic 
organisation of the family system by targeting individual family members’ perceptions of 
their roles in relation to the family system. It is accepted that the client or family will 
naturally construct new patterns of organisation through the homeostatic disruption that is 
provoked by the therapist (Andolfi, 1983; Minuchin, Nichols & Lee, 2007).   
 
The above discussion of the process of identity construction is grossly oversimplified, 
and it must again be emphasised that it relies on a complex interplay of the various 
meanings (as informed by various social discourses) participants derived from their 
experiences with their diagnostic labels. Nevertheless, although the participants’ 
experiences differed immensely as a function of their specific diagnoses, their personal 
histories, family structures and personalities, among other aspects, similarities were 
observed in the process of their identity constructions following the diagnostic events. 
Given that these similarities reflect process descriptions of participants’ stories rather 
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than content descriptions, they will heed process themes and will be discussed briefly 
below.  
 
Process Theme 1: Status quo 
 
It is evident in each participant’s story that the diagnostic event symbolises a watershed 
moment in the course of his or her life. In reflecting on their experiences with their 
respective diagnoses, all three participants expressed a form of counterfactual thinking 
where they fantasised about what course their lives could have taken had they not been 
diagnosed with their diagnostic labels. The latter points to the perception in all three 
participants of the existence of a status quo for their lives prior to the appropriation of the 
diagnostic labels. The status quo as such represents the patterns of behaving and relating 
to others that informed each the participants’ expectations of their futures.  
 
Stefan, who, due to contextual factors and his young age, was unaware of his ‘underlying 
dyslexia’, describes the status quo of his life during school to have been one of 
disappointment, academic failure and punishment. Stefan’s awareness of dyslexia being 
the source of his struggles in school did not seem to drastically alter his perception of self 
or his expectations for the future. Rather, his diagnostic label served to amplify the 
injustices he experienced as a result of the status quo. Therefore, the possibility for Stefan 
himself to be construed as an agent of change and personal liberation is not only made 
possible, but the identity implications of such a construction of self as ‘revolutionary’ 
become more powerful. 
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On the other hand, Tiaan perceived himself to be a very active and healthy individual, 
whereas Marietjie conceptualised herself as a strong woman who was always ready to 
sacrifice her time to provide a helping hand to others. From Tiaan and Marietjie’s 
responses to the news of their diagnoses as well as their struggles to incorporate the 
perceived implications represented by their diagnostic labels into their existing 
perceptions of self, it follows that the status quo constituted a personal reality for each.  
 
Thus, prior to the diagnostic event and the appropriation of their diagnostic labels, the 
reality of the status quo seemingly constituted the only course of life (with limited room 
for deviation) that was conceivable for the participants. The diagnostic event and the 
resulting appropriation of their diagnostic labels can therefore be conceptualised as 
disruptive events in as far as it disrupted the status quo of the participants, either through 
its negation or amplification. 
 
Process Theme 2: Disruptive input  
 
The process theme of disruptive input is put forward as a description of the disruptive 
effects the diagnostic events had on the participants’ expectations for their lives. Two of 
the participants, Tiaan and Marietjie, described the unsettling effects of experiencing the 
diagnostic event. Both also expressed a sense of confusion and uncertainty following the 
diagnostic event, which is strongly linked to a struggle of incorporating the diagnostic 
label into their existing definitions of self. The diagnostic event and the diagnostic label 
they received can therefore be likened to a systemic perturbation in as far as they contain 
   
     144
information that is seemingly irreconcilable with their current identities (which include 
their role expectations and patterns of relating to others).  
 
The irreconcilable nature of the diagnostic label seems to be an important factor in setting 
in motion the reflective meaning-construction process, in that it contains the potential 
effect of inducing homeostatic disruption in the participants’ support systems. 
Accordingly, this disruptive input fosters the need for experimentation with new roles 
and patterns of interpersonal relations.  
 
Although Stefan’s story contains the same process theme of ‘diagnostic label as 
disruptive input’, the age at which he was diagnosed, as well as the relative vagueness (to 
him at least) of the concept dyslexia seems to have altered the experience of disruption he 
went through. In other words, whereas Tiaan and Marietjie experienced a sudden 
confrontation with the paradoxical task of integrating their diagnostic labels into their 
existing identities, the disruptive effects of Stefan’s diagnostic label were more subtle and 
prolonged over time.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the interpersonal effects of Stefan’s diagnostic 
label commenced very early in his life, and he presents his struggles with dyslexia and his 
identity formation as a lifelong battle against oppression. As such, the disruption that the 
diagnostic label effected in Stefan’s life is different compared to that of Tiaan and 
Marietjie.  
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Firstly, the disruptive effects Stefan experienced did not resemble a crisis event, as in the 
case of Tiaan and Marietjie, but rather a subtle and gradual build-up to a climactic 
situation from which new interpersonal patterns could emerge. Also, different to Tiaan 
and Marietjie, the young age at which Stefan’s diagnostic label started affecting his life 
meant that it formed a crucial part in the development of his identity, whereas Tiaan and 
Marietjie were confronted abruptly with the task of adapting their identities.  
 
Although differences emerged in the ways in which participants experienced the 
disruptive effects of the diagnostic event, it seemed to have the common effect of 
inducing a systemic crisis in the form of altering each participant’s perception of himself 
or herself in relation to others. These systemic crises then led to an alteration in the ways 
they relate to significant others. 
 
Process Theme 3: Ensuing crises and experimenting with new patterns 
 
The diagnostic labels of participants and the disruptive effects they present for the status 
quo (in terms of their perceptions of self, their role definitions in relation to others and 
their future expectations) resulted in either a blocking or an amplification (in the case of 
Stefan) of their usual patterns of relating to others. Such blocking and amplification of 
interactional patterns seem to have the effect of inducing what can be described as 
systemic crises in the participants’ lives. As such, the status quo as the sole construction 
of their personal realities is no longer a feasible frame through which the new input 
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regarding self in relation to others (as symbolised by their diagnostic labels) can be 
incorporated into their existing identity constructions. 
 
This latter statement is illustrated through Tiaan and Marietjie’s admissions that, after the 
diagnostic events and their considerations of the implications their diagnostic labels 
signified, they were no longer able to carry on with their lives as usual. Both agreed that 
they were confronted with the task of restructuring their interpersonal relationships. Tiaan 
had to deal with the task of relinquishing control to others and sacrificing activities that 
he held dear, without losing his sense of purpose and personal worth. Marietjie, in a 
similar vein, was confronted with the task of laying down her helping duties and settling 
into the role of being the one who is taken care of. 
 
Through his appropriation of his diagnostic label, Stefan seemed to experience an 
intensification of the status quo present in his life, in that the dyslexia label reinforced his 
role definitions as an academic ‘failure’ and thereby impeded others’ expectations of him 
to achieve success. This amplification of the status quo in Stefan’s life can be said to 
have elevated the difference in perceptions he and others had of him. This is because it 
provided a new element to the context in which his successes could be interpreted and 
also amplified. By having the label dyslexia, his perceived chances of attaining success 
decreased, and therefore the importance of the successes he did obtain was amplified. 
This also had the effect of altering his usual patterns of relating to others, and in effect of 
defining his identity in a different way. 
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In each participant’s story, the disruption of existing patterns of relating and the 
experimentation with new patterns seemed to play a crucial role in the process of 
constructing meaning in terms of his or her experiences with his or her diagnostic label. 
 
Process Theme 4: Constructing meaning  
 
The meaning-construction process described here seems to invariably depend on a 
juxtaposition of old versus new patterns of behaving and relating to others. This 
reflecting process seems to draw on the differences the participant is able to recognise 
between these older and newer patterns, and is thus punctuated and conceptualised as 
personal growth. The recognition of personal growth seems to rely heavily on the 
participants’ perceptions that their new patterns of relating represent an alteration to or 
improvement on their previous patterns of relating. This was illustrated in the stories of 
all three participants, an example of which is Marietjie’s admission that she is now more 
attentive to her own needs, whereas in the past she always placed her own needs second 
to those of others. 
 
As the diagnostic labels with its perceived implications for participants’ lives represent a 
watershed moment between their old and new patterns of relating, these diagnostic labels 
are retrospectively conceptualised as having a mediating effect on participants’ perceived 
personal growth. In this sense, all three participants utilised their diagnostic labels as 
objectified realities with definite implications for their identity constructions and future 
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expectations. These objectified labels were then juxtaposed to their personal qualities and 
capacities for adapting to the ‘real implications’ of their diagnostic labels. 
 
In this way then, for all three participants, their experiences of rising above the 
debilitating effects of their conditions by utilising their own personal qualities could be 
construed as occasions for personal growth. 
 
Researcher’s comments and reflections on the integrative process of reflection 
 
To ensure the stable growth of an individual’s relationship systems, the diagnostic input 
or label demands that the relational structure and organisation of the respective systems 
undergo changes in order to avoid entropy (disorganisation) and move toward a new 
balance or homeostasis. This, from a second-order cybernetic perspective, requires that 
individual changes in terms of individuals’ role definitions and their positioning in 
relation to others evolve to allow for the integration of the new information (Andolfi, 
1989; Minuchin et al., 2007).  
 
In order to enlarge the individual’s frame of reference to allow for a harmonic integration 
of the diagnostic label with his or her identity (i.e. perceptions of self in relation to 
others), the individual has to attribute meaning to the diagnostic label as an important 
factor that contributed to personal growth. Because identity is defined in interpersonal 
terms, the meaning attributed to the diagnostic label requires that it also be defined in 
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interpersonal terms or have interpersonal significance (in that the label informs 
alternative ways of relating to others).  
 
Again, although this meaning-construction process is presented as following a linear 
path, this is deceiving, because the meanings that are attributed to the various experiences 
related to the diagnostic label do not precede or coincide with the actual experiential 
events, but are created after the fact through a self-reflective process. Therefore, the 
diagnostic event and the diagnostic label do not have fixed positive or negative meanings. 
Rather, their meanings are seen to wax and wane as a function of the individual’s 
reflection on the significance it has for his or her identity construction in relation to 
others.  
 
As long as the diagnostic label is defined purely as an intra-psychic condition with no 
relevance to the individual’s interpersonal functioning or patterns, the experience of 
personal growth is unlikely to be recognised during self-reflection and the diagnostic 
label would at best serve a useless function – and at worst be attributed with debilitative 
meaning. As is illustrated in this study, if diagnostic labels can be redefined as 
interpersonal metaphors, i.e. as pertaining to the individual’s patterns of relating to others 
and as containing indications for alternative patterns of relating, these labels could be 
utilised to restore the individual’s sense of empowerment and thereby foster a positive 
perception of self. 
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Strengths and limitations of the study 
 
This study represents an effort to describe and conceptualise from a social constructionist 
viewpoint how individuals utilise various social discourses in order to construct meaning 
from their experiences with being diagnosed with neurological, learning or psychiatric 
conditions.  
 
The focus of the study was on the interpersonal effects of diagnostic labels and the way 
this impact on participants’ identity constructions in relation to others. In this sense the 
study has illustrated that, by reframing diagnostic labels as interpersonal metaphors, 
participants were able to construct meanings from their experiences with their diagnostic 
labels. This meaning-construction process occurs when the diagnostic labels are reframed 
as lenses through which participants can view their symptomatic behaviour as signals that 
disrupt old and rigid patterns and inform alternative patterns of relating to others.  
 
I trust that this study contributes to a different understanding of diagnostic labelling and 
departs from the moralistic conceptualisations of diagnostic labelling as inherently good 
or bad. Given the fact that human beings rely on language to make sense of their 
experiences, it is a difficult, if not impossible, task to eliminate categorical devices such 
as diagnostic labels. This research offers a way for psychotherapists to conceptualise and 
utilise diagnostic labels as part of clients’ personal realities, rather than to ignore its 
relevance to clients’ spheres of experience.  
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Furthermore, this study highlights the importance of recognising the constructing powers 
of each individual to create meaning from his or her own experiences. Thus by respecting 
and appreciating clients’ internal frames of reference and offering, rather than imposing 
his or her own views on the nature of diagnostic labels, a psychotherapist can collaborate 
with the client in exploring ways to construct meanings from their diagnostic labels, 
rather than reiterating its debilitative nature. 
 
Apart from its contributions as discussed above, this study contains several limitations 
that warrant consideration. Firstly, given that the research sample consisted of only three 
individuals, the results of this study cannot be taken to be representative of the general 
South African population. In addition, the individuals that participated in this study 
represent a fairly homogenous cultural segment of the population. As participants were 
all white, Afrikaans-speaking individuals, one cannot determine the degree to which an 
individual’s culture, ethnicity and language affects the meaning-construction processes 
involved in constructing their identities.  
 
Secondly, since a purposive sampling strategy was employed in this study, the 
identification and selection of participants relied on selection criteria as determined by 
the aim of this study. This holds the implication that the sampling strategy was biased in 
that it excluded individuals who did not fit the selection criteria. As such, the possibility 
exists that the findings of this study do not apply to individuals who do not fit the 
selection criteria. It must be said, however, that, as mentioned in the introduction to this 
study, the aim was not to discover generalised truths, but rather to explore the ways in 
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which diagnostically labelled individuals manage to construct stories of success. 
Therefore, the sampling criteria (with its focus on individuals who have adapted to their 
diagnostic labels) reflect the aim of the study, namely ‘looking at individuals’ tapes of 
success’. 
 
Thirdly, the final limitation I wish to discuss concerns the degree of my involvement in 
interpreting and shaping the participants’ stories. This points to a high degree of 
subjectivity with regard to the results of this study, which makes comparisons with results 
of other similar studies implausible. Although the purpose of this study was not to 
provide an objective account of the participants’ experiences, I trust that my attempts to 
account for my personal influence on the research results are reflected through all the 
chapters. Through this effort of transparency, I encourage the reader to scrutinise my 
interpretations and engage in his or her own interpretive effort in order to judge the 
trustworthiness of the research findings. 
 
Recommendations for future research on diagnostic labelling 
 
Having considered the strengths and limitations of this study, it is recommended that 
future research endeavours into the field of diagnostic labelling focus on applying similar 
methods to an expanded participant sample. Specifically, attention can be focussed on 
exploring the effects of culture, language and ethnicity on identity construction as 
mediated through diagnostic labels.  
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Given the existence of cultural differences in conceptualising the individual’s role in 
society (as reflected in individualistic versus collectivistic cultures), an interesting 
question would be how individuals from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds utilise 
social discourses to construct meanings from their experiences with diagnostic labels to 
inform their identity constructions in relation to others.  
 
Since the social constructionist epistemology emphasises the role of language in the 
construction of social realities, the question emerges whether the language structures 
(including syntax and semantics), concepts and metaphors available to speakers of 
different languages affect the process of meaning construction presented in this study.  
 
Finally, although the recommendations presented here encourage a comparison of results 
across cultural, ethnic and language domains, it must again be kept in mind that the 
purpose of this study was not to provide generalisations. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
social constructionist epistemology posits that social realities are subjective in nature and 
mediated by a process of social negotiation. In the spirit of this basic assumption, it is 
recommended that different researchers apply their own perspectives to similar 
explorations to enter in a dialogical process regarding the effects of diagnostic labels on 
identity constructions, and avoid the ideological pitfalls of strict generalisations as 
discussed earlier in this study. 
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Appendix A: Interview schedule 
This interview schedule is used as a guide to explore important areas of interest during 
the interview process. The questions are not followed rigidly, but act as markers to guide 
the researcher and participant as to the type of information that is sought and to prevent 
the interview from going too far off track. 
 
1) Biographical Details 
- Age: 
- Level of education: 
- Occupation: 
- Relationship status: 
- Family structure (nuclear family, only child, siblings, divorced parents, 
etc.): 
- Home circumstances (who lives with participant?): 
- Diagnosis: 
 
2) Particulars of Diagnosis 
- Can you remember when you were first diagnosed with (enter the 
participant’s condition)? 
- By whom were you diagnosed as such? 
- What led up to you visiting the Doctor, Psychologist, Psychiatrist, etc.? 
- Whose decision was it to seek help? 
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3) Perception of Self 
- What was your reaction when you were diagnosed with (enter the 
participant’s condition)? 
i. How did you feel? 
ii. What did you think? 
iii. What did you do? 
- If response is negative in focus: Was there anything that eased your 
thoughts, feelings, etc. 
- What were you told about (enter the participant’s condition)? 
i. By the health practitioner? 
ii. By other people? 
- What was your reaction to these people and what they said? 
i. How did you feel? 
ii. What did you think? 
iii. What did you do/say? 
- Has your perception of yourself changed in any way following your 
diagnosis? 
i. If so, how? 
ii. If negative focus: can you think of any positive changes in your 
perception of self? 
- How would you describe yourself  
i. before being diagnosed? 
ii. since being diagnosed? 
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- What was the hardest thing about being diagnosed with (enter the 
participant’s condition)? 
- What was the best thing about being diagnosed with (enter the 
participant’s condition)? 
 
4) Interpersonal Effects of Diagnosis 
- What was your family’s response to your diagnosis? 
- Was this response what you hoped for? 
- Would you change anything about their response? 
- How has your relationship with your family changed after the diagnosis? 
i. If negative focus: Do you recall any positive changes that occurred 
after the diagnosis? 
- How do other people respond to your diagnosis? 
i. If negative focus: Are there people who respond differently, say 
more positive? 
- How has your diagnosis affected your relationships with other people? 
i. If negative focus: Has your diagnosis had any positive effects on 
your relationships? 
- Did/Do you tell other people about your diagnosis? 
- If so, who did you tell and why? 
- If not, what kept/keeps you from telling others? 
- Is there anything that makes it easy to tell people? 
- Is there anything that makes it difficult to tell people? 
   
     163
- Have you ever regretted telling anyone about your diagnosis? 
i. If so, how did this affect your future disclosures? 
ii. If negative focus: Did this interaction have any positive effects on 
your choice to disclose? 
- From whom do you seek support/who is your provider of support? 
- Would you say that you had/have sufficient support or would you (have) 
benefit(ed) from more support? 
 
5) Current Understanding of Condition 
- If the man on the street asked you to explain what (enter participant’s 
condition) is, how would you explain it to him? 
- Would you say (enter the participant’s condition) makes you different 
from people who are not ‘mentally ill’? 
i. If so, in what way? 
ii. If negative focus: Any positives? 
 
6) Occupational (or Educational) Outcomes of Diagnosis 
- How has your diagnosis affected your outcomes at school or in your job? 
- Would you say that you benefited in any way from your diagnosis? 
i. If so, in what way? 
- Would you say that you have been disadvantaged through your diagnosis? 
i. If so, in what way? 
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7) Sense of Wellbeing 
- How would you describe your sense of wellbeing or quality of life? 
(Specifier: for example, would you say that you are living a fulfilling life, 
do you find something lacking in life, are you unsatisfied with life, etc.?) 
- How would you describe your level of functioning in life? (Would you say 
that you are in the process of adapting to living with (enter the 
participant’s condition), have adapted to living with it, are nowhere near 
adapted to living with it?) 
- What adjectives would you use to describe yourself as a person living with 
(enter the participant’s condition)? 
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Appendix B: Consent form 
Original Consent Form – Participant Copy 
 
My name is Francois Nico van Zyl and I am registered as a Master’s student in Clinical Psychology at the 
University of South Africa (Unisa). As part of the Master’s course I am required to complete a research 
project. I am conducting research regarding individuals’ experiences of adapting to the stigma of being 
formally diagnosed with a psychiatric, neurological or learning condition and what they perceive their 
outcomes to be relative to their label. My hope is that this research may benefit each participant, though 
this cannot be guaranteed, and may be helpful to professionals and lay people who deal with similar clients. 
 
The interview will be available to my dissertation supervisor and the examiner responsible for awarding a 
mark for my dissertation. No personally identifiable details will be used in the transcribed version of the 
interview; only general information so as to protect your anonymity.   
 
Your name will not be recorded anywhere on the transcribed interview, and no one will be able to link it to 
you. All personal information will remain confidential. 
 
The interview will last around 60 minutes. I would like you to be as open and honest as possible in 
answering the questions I pose to you. Some questions may be of a personal and/or sensitive nature. I will 
also ask some questions that you may not have thought about before, and which involve thinking about the 
past or the future. Even if you are not absolutely certain about the answers to these questions, try to think 
about them and answer as best you can. When it comes to answering these questions, there are no right or 
wrong answers.  
 
Your participation in this research project is voluntary. If you do not wish to answer a question, you may 
refrain from doing so. Even if you agreed to participate initially, you may stop at a later stage and 
discontinue your participation. If you refuse to participate or withdraw at any stage, you will not be 
prejudiced in any way. 
 
If I ask you a question that makes you feel sad or upset, we can stop the interview and discuss it. There are 
also people to whom I can refer you who are willing and able to talk it through with you if you so wish. If 
you need to speak with anyone at a later stage, a professional at the Unisa clinic can be reached at the 
following telephone number 012 429 8930. 
 
I may require (an) additional interview/s at a later stage, and may also like to discuss my findings and 
proposals around the research with you, once I have completed my study. 
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If you have any other questions about my study, please feel free to contact my dissertation supervisor Prof. 
Juan Nel, at the University of South Africa, on: 
 012 429 8089 or via email: nelja@unisa.ac.za 
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Original Consent Form – Researcher Copy 
I hereby agree to participate in the research regarding individuals’ experiences of adapting to the stigma of 
being formally diagnosed with a psychiatric condition and what they perceive their outcomes to be relative 
to their label. I understand that I am participating freely and voluntarily. I also understand that I can stop 
this interview at any point should I not want to continue and that this decision will not prejudice me in any 
way. 
 
The purpose of the study has been explained to me, and I understand what is expected of me. 
 
I understand that this is a research project, which may or may not necessarily benefit me personally. I have 
received the telephone number of a person to contact should I need to speak about any issues that may arise 
as a result of this interview. I understand that this consent form will not be linked to the research 
documentation, and that my personal information will remain confidential. I understand that, if possible, 
feedback will be given to me on the findings of the completed research. 
 
Signed at ________________, on this ________ day of _____________ 20___. 
 
__________________________    _________________________ 
     Name of Participant              Name of Researcher 
 
__________________________    _________________________   
    Signature of participant           Signature of Researcher  
 
Additional consent to audio and/or video recording: 
In addition to the above, I hereby agree to the audio and/or video recording of this interview for the 
purposes of data capture. I understand that no personally identifying information or recording concerning 
me will be released in any form. I understand that these recordings will be kept securely in a locked 
environment and will be destroyed or erased once data capture and analysis are complete. 
Signed at ________________, on this ________ day of _____________ 20___. 
 
__________________________    _________________________ 
        Name of Participant            Name of Researcher 
 
 
__________________________    _________________________   
     Signature of participant           Signature of Researcher  
